Published on and written by Cyril Jarnias
The history of Burundi is that of a rare territory in Africa: a state whose contemporary borders almost identically extend a former pre-colonial kingdom. But this territorial continuity contrasts with another, darker reality: several centuries of social hierarchies, transformed into rigid ethnic cleavages by colonization, and then into cycles of massacres and civil wars after independence. At the heart of this long journey, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement marks a pivotal moment, where the country attempts to break with the logic of domination and revenge.
To understand the Arusha accords, one must consider Burundi’s long history: the period of the *mwami* kings, the German then Belgian colonizations, the emergence of political parties, the assassinations of major figures such as Louis Rwagasore and Melchior Ndadaye. This power-sharing architecture was designed to avoid the repetition of past conflicts.
From the Kingdom of Burundi to European Colonization
For several centuries, even before the arrival of Europeans, the territory of Burundi was structured around a Bantu kingdom, often called the Kingdom of Urundi. At the head of this state, a king – the mwami – from the princely lineage of the Ganwa, exercised political, military, and ritual power simultaneously. This power was not absolute: it rested on a dense network of noble lineages, regional chiefs, advisors, and local notables.
Society was hierarchical but relatively fluid. The Hutu were predominantly farmers, the Tutsi dominated cattle herding, and the Twa – a Pygmy people – practiced hunting, gathering, or pottery. Yet these categories were not fixed: wealth, marriage, or the protection of a patron could allow a prosperous Hutu to attain the social status associated with the Tutsi, while poverty could cause a Tutsi to lose prestige. At the top, the ganwa nobility formed a separate group, distinct from both Hutu and Tutsi, playing a stabilizing role among the components of the population.
The kingdom’s economy was mainly agricultural, based on the cultivation of beans, peas, and cereals, supplemented by livestock and exchange networks with neighboring regions, especially around Lake Tanganyika. The first European visitors in the mid-19th century compared the political sophistication of the kingdom to that of ancient Mediterranean city-states. However, on the eve of colonization, royal power was weakened by rivalries between lineages and the challenge from certain chiefs.
German Rule: Indirect and Hesitant Domination
At the end of the 19th century, the Berlin Conference divided Africa among colonial powers. The territory of Burundi was assigned to the German Empire and integrated, along with Rwanda and mainland Tanzania, into German East Africa. In practice, German control remained fragile for a long time. The colonial authorities had few men, relied on the king and local chiefs, and practiced largely indirect rule.
The mwami Mwezi IV Gisabo initially refused all collaboration: he rejected European symbols, opposed the establishment of Christian missions, and tried to contain foreign influence. But Berlin advanced through force and cunning. Officers like Friedrich Robert von Beringe adopted a strategy of division, occasionally supporting rebel figures hostile to the king, such as Kilima, presented as an “anti-king” in the north of the country. Through this game of alliances and confrontations, the Germans weakened the monarchy while consolidating their own position.
The German military campaign of the early 20th century forced King Mwezi IV to sign the Treaty of Ikiganda. This treaty established a hypocritical balance: the king recognized German suzerainty in exchange for official recognition of his authority over the kingdom. The consequences were profound: trust between the royal court and the Germans was permanently broken, and colonial arbitrations exacerbated internal quarrels within the nobility.
At the same time, German presence changed the daily lives of the population. The colonists introduced a monetary tax system, imposed forced labor for roads and cash crops, introduced new crops like the potato, established missions, military posts, and the first health facilities. But the administration remained patchy, marked by frequent changes of officials and a deep ignorance of local structures.
From Belgian Conquest to “Laboratory” Policies
World War I upended this order. From 1916, Belgian troops from the Congo conquered the territory of German East Africa. Gitega, the royal capital of Burundi, fell, and the regency governing on behalf of the young mwami Mwambutsa IV officially surrendered. A few years later, the League of Nations entrusted Belgium with a mandate over the territory of Ruanda-Urundi, encompassing Rwanda and Burundi. After 1945, this mandate became a UN trusteeship, with the theoretical goal of preparing for independence.
Unlike the German period, Belgian administration in Burundi was characterized by a more intrusive and centralized intervention. It deeply reorganized power structures by redrawing chieftaincies and replacing many traditional Hutu chiefs with lineages considered more docile. The capital was established at Usumbura (future Bujumbura), on the site of a former German military post. At the same time, the Catholic missions, while developing education and healthcare, served as relays for colonial ideology.
It was in this context that the Belgian administration undertook what would become an “ethnic engineering”. Where a flexible social hierarchy had previously existed, it imposed fixed categories, inscribed on identity cards: Hutu, Tutsi, Twa. Pseudo-scientific theories, spread by certain European researchers and missionaries, attributed to the Tutsi a supposed Ethiopian or Nilotic origin, a lineage with the ancient Egyptians or populations of Asia Minor. Their height and demeanor were erected as signs of an imaginary proximity to Europeans, justifying their promotion to positions of authority.
This racialized hierarchization, combined with the educational and administrative exclusion of the Hutu, created deep resentment. The Hutu were assigned to hard labor, subjected to forced labor for coffee or tea plantations, public works, and the requisitioning of cash crops. The Twa, already marginalized, remained at the very bottom of the social and political ladder. Colonization thus rigidized previously fluid distinctions, transforming them into a true key for distributing privileges and humiliations.
Toward Independence: Promise of Unity, Seeds of Discord
After World War II, the wind of decolonization swept across Africa. Under pressure from the UN, Belgium was ordered to prepare Ruanda-Urundi for self-government. From the late 1950s, Burundian political life organized around emerging parties, including the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), a nationalist movement founded in 1958. Its leader, Prince Louis Rwagasore, son of King Mwambutsa IV, embodied a unifying line: he advocated Hutu-Tutsi-Twa unity, an end to colonial rule, and a break with divisive policies.
Election results validated his approach. In the first national elections, UPRONA won a landslide victory, with a strong Hutu presence among its elected officials, confirming the potential of a non-ethnicized political project.
Prince Louis Rwagasore, Prime Minister of Burundi
This political elimination had a devastating impact. On one hand, it deprived Burundi of a leader capable of uniting the country’s different components in the face of the colonial legacy. On the other hand, it fueled conspiracy theories, resentments, and mistrust between social and ethnic groups. The implicit message was clear: a project that transcended divisions could be physically struck down.
Burundi gained independence as a constitutional monarchy recognized by the UN.
From Monarchy to Military Power: The Rise of Political Violence
The first years following independence quickly showed the limits of the monarchical balance. The king tried to maintain a fragile compromise, notably by appointing a Hutu Prime Minister, Pierre Ngendandumwe. He was assassinated in January 1965, in a context of regional rivalries and the Cold War, where Burundi was seen as a possible rear base for revolutionary movements in neighboring Congo.
Legislative elections held that same year gave a majority to Hutu representatives. Yet the king ignored this signal and chose to appoint a Tutsi Prime Minister, Léopold Biha, from his inner circle. This decision, perceived as a denial of the popular will, fueled a deep sense of injustice. A coup attempt by Hutu officers and gendarmes broke out in October 1965. It failed, but served as a pretext for brutal repression carried out by the predominantly Tutsi army.
In the aftermath of the reprisals, many Hutu leaders in the army and political life were executed. Thousands of people were killed across the country, paralyzing parliamentary institutions. The Tutsi strengthened their control over the state apparatus. The king, discredited, went into exile. Within a few years, power shifted definitively from the monarchy to army officers.
In 1966, a double break completed this transition. The king’s son, who proclaimed himself Ntare V, first tried to take control of the state, before being in turn overthrown by his Prime Minister, Captain Michel Micombero. He abolished the monarchy and established the First Republic, a one-party regime controlled by a core of Tutsi officers, many from the province of Bururi. Burundi became, in effect, a military dictatorship where any dissent, especially Hutu, was perceived as an existential threat.
Genocide, Exiles, and Radicalization: 1972 as a Turning Point
Under Micombero’s presidency, Tutsi domination became even more institutionalized. Hutu were gradually excluded from the army, administration, and positions of responsibility in education or the judiciary. Tension remained constant, fueled by the memory of the 1965 Hutu uprising and by neighboring events in Rwanda, where a “social” revolution led by the Hutu majority had overthrown the Tutsi monarchy at the turn of the 1960s, causing an exodus of many Tutsi to Burundi.
In 1972, a new explosion of violence permanently marked the country’s history. Hutu groups organized an insurrection in southern and western Burundi; they attacked Tutsi populations, killed civilians, briefly seized weapons, and proclaimed a short-lived “Republic of Martyazo.” The regime’s response quickly went beyond the military framework. Under the guise of restoring order, the army and militias linked to the power launched a systematic campaign of massacres against the Hutu population, targeting educated elites in particular: students, teachers, civil servants, clergy, and administrative cadres.
Between 1972 and 1973, Burundi experienced a tragedy, called “Ikiza” (the great disaster), which caused between 100,000 and 200,000 deaths and the exile of hundreds of thousands of Hutu. This event is considered a genocide specifically aimed at eliminating the capacity of the Hutu majority to form elites and participate in political power.
Inside the country, an iron lid closed down. Fear inhibited mobilization, speech about the events was controlled or repressed, and the official version denied any extermination plan. Externally, the international community reacted little: distance, local complexity, the Cold War, and the absence of media images left this drama largely in the shadows. The army and the single party thus consolidated a domination that would seem, for more than a decade, nearly unassailable.
From Bagaza to Buyoya: Reforms, Stalemates, and New Massacres
In 1976, Colonel Jean‑Baptiste Bagaza overthrew Micombero in a bloodless coup. Also a Tutsi, he promised reforms, launched modernization programs – roads, land development, an attempt at controlled political opening. A new constitution in 1981 again maintained the principle of a single party but introduced a language of national reconciliation. Bagaza, re-elected without competition, nevertheless leaned toward an increasingly marked authoritarianism, notably through the repression of religious activities deemed opposed to the regime and the imprisonment of opponents.
In 1987, Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi officer, took power in a coup d’état. He dissolved Parliament and the constitution, and established a Military Committee for National Salvation. His presidency was marked by official recognition of the “Hutu-Tutsi question” and several symbolic measures: appointment of a Hutu Prime Minister, limited efforts to integrate Hutu into the army, drafting of a Charter of National Unity, and adoption of a new constitution establishing controlled multipartyism.
But these reforms came in a context of acute tensions. In 1988, deadly clashes broke out in the north of the country, causing, according to various sources, tens or even hundreds of thousands of deaths, mostly Hutu. Again, the violence fed on cross-accusations, rumors of plots, and unhealed memories of previous massacres. The cycle was self-perpetuating: each community could list a litany of victims, while downplaying or denying the wrongs committed by “its own.”
The Aborted Democracy of 1993 and the Plunge into Civil War
In the early 1990s, under international and regional pressure, Pierre Buyoya finally embarked on a genuine process of pluralism: a new constitution opened the political field to parties, provided they did not define themselves on ethnic grounds. It was within this framework that the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), predominantly Hutu, emerged as a major force. In June 1993, the presidential election, judged free and fair, saw the clear victory of its candidate, Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically elected Hutu president.
After his election, the Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye tried to ease tensions by including Tutsi and opponents in his government. He avoided brutal purges in the army and proposed moderate reforms to correct ethnic imbalances. However, some Tutsi officers perceived his coming to power as a threat to their status, fearing a reversal similar to that suffered by the Tutsi in Rwanda in the 1960s.
On October 21, 1993, a group of extremist officers launched a coup d’état. President Ndadaye was assassinated, along with several of his close collaborators. The strategic objective of the putschists – to regain control of the state – ultimately failed under international pressure and internal divisions. But the damage was done: the violent elimination of the first Hutu president acted as a detonator.
Some estimates exceed 100,000 victims of ethnic violence by the end of 1993 in Burundi.
It was in this spiral that the Burundian civil war took hold, lasting more than a decade and claiming about 300,000 lives, in addition to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons or refugees in neighboring countries. The fault line was largely ethnicized, even if, as always, political interests, regional issues, and internal leadership rivalries were superimposed on intercommunal hatred.
Hutu Rebellions, Coups d’État, and the Exhaustion of War
After Ndadaye’s assassination, a new Hutu president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, and then Sylvestre Ntibantunganya tried to govern under conditions of extreme insecurity. The plane carrying Ntaryamira and his Rwandan counterpart Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down in April 1994, triggering the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda and worsening the regional situation. Burundi saw hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees flow in and became a major chessboard in the struggles between armed movements.
Several Hutu rebel groups formed or strengthened, with the CNDD-FDD (emerging from FRODEBU) as the main force and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, of radical inspiration, which multiplied attacks. On the other side, the national army remained dominated by Tutsi officers, supported by extremist militias and urban gangs.
In July 1996, in a context of persistent chaos and political deadlock, Pierre Buyoya returned to power in a new coup d’état, overthrowing President Ntibantunganya. His return triggered unanimous condemnation in the region and the imposition of an economic embargo, which severely affected the population. The war intensified; “regroupment” operations forced tens of thousands of Hutu to concentrate in army-controlled camps, where malnutrition, violence, and abuse became widespread. At the same time, rebel movements found sanctuaries and logistical support in Tanzania or Zaire (future DRC), where they set up bases, sometimes at the cost of massive child recruitment.
The persistence of Burundian Hutu rebellions, protected from Zaire, was perceived by Rwanda as a destabilizing factor. This concern was one of the reasons that pushed Rwanda and its allies to launch the First Congo War in late 1996, in order to eliminate the sanctuaries of Rwandan and Burundian Hutu militias on Zairian soil.
The Arusha Agreement: An Architecture to End the War
It was in this context of generalized war, but also of progressive exhaustion of the actors and international pressure, that the process culminating in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi took shape. From 1995, regional mediation efforts were launched. Former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere was tasked with facilitating talks that brought together the Burundian government, the National Assembly, and a broad range of political parties and armed movements.
The negotiations were arduous, hampered by accumulated mistrust, contradictory agendas, and the continuation of fighting on the ground. Upon Nyerere’s death in 1999, Nelson Mandela took up the torch. The former South African president left his mark: a more direct tone, increased pressure on the parties, use of moral arguments, but also diplomatic leverage. Gradually, a consensus coalesced around a key principle: lasting peace required a profound redefinition of the Burundian state, its institutions, and its security forces.
Signed in Arusha, Tanzania, the agreement is a comprehensive framework document, composed of a core text and five supplementary protocols, accompanied by annexes detailing commitments, security force structures, ceasefire modalities, commission reports, and an implementation timetable. It explicitly aims to end the civil war by formulating an ambitious objective: to establish in Burundi a new political, economic, social, and judicial order, based on peace, stability, justice, the rule of law, national reconciliation, unity, and development.
Key Principles: Power Sharing and Rejection of Domination Logics
At the heart of Arusha’s political provisions is the idea of a structured power-sharing arrangement, based on ethnic quotas for major institutions, to prevent the lasting hegemony of one group over another. The system provides, for example, strict limits on the proportion of Hutu and Tutsi within the government, Parliament, army, or police, in order to reflect the overall composition of the population while guaranteeing specific rights to minorities.
The agreement provides a series of tables to distribute key positions (defense forces, administration, major state functions) among the communities. The objective is to reassure each group about its inclusion, while preventing the reconstitution of an ethnocracy, whether Tutsi or Hutu.
The agreement also provides for constitutional safeguards against excessive concentration of power in the hands of a single party or individual. The principle of separation of powers – executive, legislative, judicial – is affirmed, as is the obligation to adopt an electoral law that takes into account all components of the nation. Coups d’état are explicitly condemned, and the logic of multipartyism regulated by law is consecrated.
The document goes further by attacking the root of violence: it proclaims the will to eradicate genocide and ban all forms of division, discrimination, or exclusion based on ethnicity, region, religion, gender, or other criteria. Political organizations that advocate such discrimination are prohibited. To give substance to these principles, the agreement recognizes equal rights between men and women and inscribes a catalog of fundamental freedoms: right to life, security, physical integrity, protection against torture, right to a fair trial, freedom of marriage, right to respect for private life.
The Social and Historical Dimension: Victims, Memory, and Justice
The Arusha Agreement does not merely redistribute power. It also attempts to address the aftermath of decades of accumulated violence. It devotes important mechanisms to issues of refugees, internally displaced persons, and various victims of past conflicts. The text provides for the creation of a National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims, tasked with coordinating operations for return, resettlement, reintegration, and compensation. Property confiscated or stolen during crises must be returned to their owners or rightful heirs, according to mechanisms organized by the state.
Children, often enlisted as combatants or victims of mistreatment, are subject to specific protection measures. The text draws attention to particularly vulnerable groups: orphans, street children, widows, people with disabilities, minor heads of households, who must benefit from rehabilitation and promotion programs. Rural poverty is recognized as a structural problem, and the role of the state in development, particularly agricultural development, is affirmed.
The peace agreement includes specific provisions for historically excluded communities, going beyond the Hutu-Tutsi divide.
Special recognition granted to this group long marginalized and reduced to a near-pariah status.
Implementation of policies to improve the political representation and living conditions of the Batwa.
Regarding justice and memory, Arusha is a pioneering text for the region. It calls for the establishment of a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission, tasked with shedding light on past violations, documenting atrocities, giving voice to victims, and considering recommendations for reparations. It also insists on the fight against impunity for the most serious crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and attempted coups d’état cannot be covered by general amnesties.
On a symbolic level, the text provides for the erection of a national monument bearing the words “Never Again” and the establishment of a national day of remembrance, intended to commemorate all victims, regardless of affiliation. This approach breaks with decades of selective commemorations, often reserved for a single community and instrumentalized by the power.
Thus, the agreement embodies a hybridization between immediate political demands (ceasefire, power sharing) and a long-term transformative ambition for political culture and social relations.
Defense Forces, Security, and Ceasefire
Another fundamental component concerns the armed and security forces. The agreement establishes the principle that the army and police must become national, professional, apolitical, and representative institutions of all the country’s ethnic and regional components, with an increasing emphasis on women’s participation. The restructuring of these bodies involves the progressive integration of former rebel combatants, the demobilization of militias, the disarmament of civilians, and the correction of imbalances inherited from the era when the army was almost exclusively Tutsi.
The ceasefire itself is treated with a remarkable level of detail. In addition to the immediate cessation of hostilities – combat, troop movements, attacks on civilians, arms deliveries, hate propaganda – the agreement provides for the release of political prisoners, the closure of forced regroupment camps, and the prohibition of laying new mines. It establishes a Ceasefire Commission composed of representatives of the government, signatory armed groups, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi. Its mission: to monitor troop withdrawals, weapons storage, troop cantonment, civilian disarmament, and mine clearance.
Body responsible for the coordination and monitoring of the implementation of commitments.
Ensure overall coordination of actions and stakeholders.
Identify and monitor any delays in the implementation of provisions.
Resolve disputes of interpretation that may arise between signatories.
Table 1 – Some Structuring Axes of the Arusha Agreement
| Key Axis | Main Objective |
|---|---|
| Power Sharing | Prevent hegemony of one ethnic group, ensure balanced representation in institutions |
| Army and Police Reform | Create professional, apolitical, multiethnic forces, integrating ex-rebels and correcting imbalances |
| Justice and Memory | Fight impunity for serious crimes, establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission |
| Reintegration of Refugees and Displaced Persons | Facilitate return, resettlement, and compensation of people affected by conflicts |
| Protection of Vulnerable Groups | Give specific attention to children, widows, disabled, Batwa, and other marginalized groups |
| Prevention of Coups d’État | Constitutionally regulate the exercise of power and strengthen separation of powers |
Initial Limitations: Excluded Actors and Partial Implementation
At the time of its signing, the Arusha Agreement did not include all the key actors of the conflict. Two of the main Hutu rebel movements – the CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL – initially refused to join, considering that the text did not sufficiently meet their demands or contesting the legitimacy of the delegates present. This absence delayed the complete cessation of hostilities and recalled that peace is not decreed by a simple signature, especially when some holders of armed force remained outside the process.
Additional negotiations were therefore necessary. In 2002, the CNDD-FDD concluded a separate ceasefire agreement with the transitional government in Dar es Salaam, followed by the Pretoria Protocol on Power Sharing in political, defense, and security matters. These texts refined and supplemented Arusha’s provisions, particularly on the integration of fighters and the allocation of military posts. In 2006, the Palipehutu-FNL in turn signed a cessation of hostilities agreement, marking the formal end of the organized Hutu armed rebellion.
On an institutional level, a new constitution adopted in 2005 incorporated the bulk of Arusha’s principles – notably the quota system, recognition of national diversity, separation of powers, and prohibition of discriminatory parties. Transitional institutions were set up: a Transitional Senate including former heads of state, representatives of the Twa, and co-opted members of the National Assembly; special mechanisms for the appointment of provincial governors, judges of the Constitutional Court, and communal administrators.
International and regional monitoring mechanisms accompanied these steps. The Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi, chaired by the Ugandan head of state, guaranteed the agreement, while the President of Kenya signed as a witness. Neighboring countries were called upon to cooperate in curbing the illicit circulation of weapons and preventing the infiltration of armed groups into their territory.
Ten years after the signing, an evaluation gave the implementation of the agreement a score of approximately 78 out of 100, indicating substantial but imperfect achievement. Indeed, certain key points – particularly regarding transitional justice and inclusive memory – remained unfinished or partially applied.
Table 2 – Simplified Timeline of the Trajectory Toward/From Arusha
| Period / Event | Main Content |
|---|---|
| 1962 – Independence | Constitutional monarchy under Mwambutsa IV, attempt at Hutu-Tutsi balance |
| 1966 – First Republic | Micombero’s coup, abolition of monarchy, Tutsi military regime |
| 1972 – “Ikiza” | Genocide targeting Hutu, 100,000 to 200,000 deaths, mass exodus |
| 1976–1987 – Bagaza | Reforms and modernization, but maintenance of Tutsi domination and repression |
| 1987–1993 – Buyoya (1st period) | Limited opening, new constitution, first free elections |
| 1993 – Election of Ndadaye | First democratic victory of a Hutu, assassination and outbreak of civil war |
| 1996 – Return of Buyoya (coup) | Army retakes power, regional embargo, intensification of conflict |
| 1998–2000 – Negotiations | Nyerere then Mandela mediation, drafting of the Arusha Agreement |
| 2000 – Signing of Arusha | Framework peace agreement, power sharing, security reforms, justice and memory |
| 2002–2006 – Complementary accords | Ceasefires with CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL, adjustment of power sharing |
| 2005 – New constitution and elections | Integration of Arusha into the Constitution, election of Pierre Nkurunziza by Parliament |
After Arusha: New Balances, Old Fragilities
The election of Pierre Nkurunziza, former leader of the CNDD-FDD, to the presidency in 2005, symbolized the shift from a power long dominated by the Tutsi to a Hutu political majority. In the immediate term, this change occurred within the framework defined by Arusha: power sharing, quotas, Tutsi participation in institutions, integration of former rebels into the army and police. For several years, the country experienced a significant reduction in mass violence, even if local clashes and abuses persisted.
Despite a system of power sharing between ethnic groups, the CNDD-FDD regime and a narrow circle of military personnel strengthened their control over the state. The political opposition space shrank, independent media came under pressure, and the party’s youth league (Imbonerakure) acted as an informal militia in some regions.
The open crisis in 2015, when Nkurunziza announced his candidacy for a third term deemed contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Arusha accords and the resulting constitution, revealed the fragility of the power-sharing architecture. Protests were repressed, a military coup attempt failed, and arbitrary arrests and political assassinations multiplied. Hundreds of people were killed, thousands arrested, and nearly a quarter of a million Burundians took refuge abroad.
Respect for presidential term limits and the consensual nature of constitutional revisions, fundamental principles of the Arusha agreement, are currently contested. This evolution raises fears, both nationally and internationally, of a return to personalization of power, in contradiction with the collective and anti-monopolistic spirit of the agreement.
Memory, Justice, and the Future: A Story Still Being Reconstructed
The recent history of Burundi shows that signing a peace agreement, however ambitious, is not enough to sustainably resolve conflicts rooted in decades of massacres, discrimination, and state lies. The Arusha Agreement lays solid foundations for institutional balance and rights, but its memorial and judicial pillar remains a work in progress.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established by law in 2014, operates in a tense political climate. Despite some local commemoration initiatives (like in Bugendana), most massacre sites are not marked or protected, and may be covered by new infrastructure. A culture of silence and fear, maintained by successive regimes, hinders collective recognition of suffering.
Research shows, however, that the memory of violence is omnipresent in Burundian families, transmitted from generation to generation. The vast majority of inhabitants report having been affected, directly or indirectly, by serious violations. They hold information, stories, names of victims and perpetrators. One of the major challenges is to transform this fragmented memory, often instrumentalized by unilateral narratives, into a plural national memory that does not obscure anyone’s suffering.
The Arusha Agreement establishes a memorial framework (national monument, day of remembrance, truth commission) whose implementation falls to the country. At the same time, demands for reparations addressed to Germany and Belgium aim to recognize colonial violence: massacres, looting, destruction of villages, and structural racial policies.
A Unique Trajectory in the Great Lakes Region
The history of Burundi is distinguished by a striking continuity of its territory, but also by striking similarities with its Rwandan neighbor in terms of instrumentalized ethnic cleavages, genocides, and forced migrations. In both cases, colonization transformed social hierarchies into racialized identities, administratively codified, used to govern at low cost, and then abandoned to themselves at independence.
Burundi’s specificity lies, in part, in the persistence of a Tutsi military core in power for three decades, the succession of coups d’état and preventive massacres targeting Hutu elites, and the way the 1990s civil war led to a consociational compromise at Arusha, with formalized ethnic quotas. This choice has often been presented as a “lesser evil”: it consolidates identities one might have wished to transcend, but it avoids, at least temporarily, the hegemony of one over the other.
Political analysis of Burundi
The future will tell whether this architecture can evolve toward a system where political affiliation is no longer indexed, even indirectly, to ethnic origin, but to projects, ideas, programs. For now, the memory of the key dates – independence, coups, the 1972 massacres, the 1993-2005 civil war, the signing of Arusha – continues to structure Burundians’ understanding of their own trajectory. It reminds us, at each crisis, of the fragility of peace when it is not accompanied by deep work on truth, justice, and mutual recognition.
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement helped end a very deadly conflict. It proposes an institutional overhaul and establishes the fundamental principle of genuine power sharing among all the country’s ethnic groups (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa) as an essential condition for a sustainable future.
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