Published on and written by Cyril Jarnias
At the crossroads of the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Oman, the Sultanate of Oman has built over millennia a singular history, shaped by long-distance navigation, imperial rivalries, internal resistance, and political rebirths. Far from being just a “small Gulf state,” Oman is one of the oldest independent states in the Arab world, heir to the ancient region of Magan, a unique elective imamate, and a maritime empire that once dominated the coasts of East Africa.
Oman’s history spans prehistory, the ancient trade of copper and incense, Ibadi political experiments, confrontations with the Portuguese and British empires, and the building of a modern state under the Al Bu Said dynasty. Today, the country still asserts its decision-making independence and a diplomacy focused on mediation.
From Early Humans to the Magan Civilization
Long before the emergence of an organized state, the territory of Oman has been inhabited by humans for over 100,000 years. Excavations at Aybut Al Auwal in Dhofar have uncovered stone tools linked to the “Late Nubian Complex,” dated by luminescence to around 106,000 years ago. These remains support the hypothesis of human populations migrating from Africa via the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, taking advantage of an Arabian Peninsula that was warmer and more humid than today.
Other discoveries – Paleolithic tools over 100,000 years old in caves in the south and center of the country, or at the Jebel Faya site in the present-day UAE – show that the eastern flank of the peninsula was a long-term settlement corridor. Around 6000–3000 BCE, fishing communities settled at Ras al Hamra, west of Muscat, left behind shell middens and burials attesting to continuous occupation for three millennia.
During the Bronze Age, the territory corresponding to Oman and the Emirates is identified in Mesopotamian cuneiform texts as Magan (or Makan). From the 3rd millennium BCE, they refer to this region as a major supplier of copper and diorite, a black stone used for statues and stelae.
The scribes of Sumer and Akkad
Archaeology confirms this prominent economic role. From the mid-3rd millennium BCE, the extraction and smelting of copper in the region reached a veritable proto-industrial scale. Sites like Maysar, excavated by the German Mining Museum, have yielded slag heaps and evidence of metallurgy workshops, while over 150 medieval smelting sites recorded in the country attest to the longevity of this activity. Copper was exported in the form of “sugarloaf” ingots, while Magan also supplied gabbro, wood, marine products, and skilled labor from miners, smiths, stonemasons, and shipwrights.
The ships of Magan, recognizable by their reed hulls coated with black bitumen imported from Iraq, could carry about twenty tons of cargo. They linked the ports of Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, Iran, and Bactria, transporting copper, aromatic resins, dates, and agricultural products on the outward journey, and bringing back bitumen, grains, textiles, and plant materials on the return. This example illustrates how the territory of present-day Oman was integrated very early into a networked economy, fed by maritime routes.
Traces of this early phase remain visible in necropolises like those of the Hafit period near Jabal Hafit, where over 200 single-chambered burial cairns have been uncovered, containing decorated jars, metal pins, and stone or faience beads similar to Mesopotamian types. The “beehive” tombs that still dot the mountains of northern Oman are another spectacular marker of these protohistoric societies, as are the petroglyphs of Wadi Tanuf depicting a figure flanked by Indian cattle, recalling ancient links with the Indus civilization.
Incense, Arab Tribes, and Persian Influences
In the south, in Dhofar, another pillar of the future Omani identity was established: incense production. This resin, extracted from local boswellia trees, was exported from the 2nd millennium BCE to Pharaonic Egypt, where it was used for perfume, worship, and embalming. Later, the Bible would associate the frankincense and myrrh brought by the Magi with this “Land of Frankincense” – a territory in southern Oman now inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. For centuries, the Dhofar region thus supplied an essential luxury product to Mediterranean and Near Eastern civilizations.
Period of migration of the Azd tribes from Yemen to Oman following the collapse of the Marib Dam.
Other migratory waves, from the Nejd, completed this ancient Arab settlement. Later, chroniclers attribute dominance of the region in the 8th century BCE to lineages like the Yaarub – descendants of Qahtan – and some 19th-century scholars put forward the idea of a local chief recognizing the authority of Cyrus the Great, a sign of complex interplay between Iranian powers and Arab tribes. While archaeological evidence remains limited regarding Achaemenid control, sources suggest the north of the country was integrated into the satrapy of Maka.
In the 12th-13th centuries, the Nabhani dynasty, ruling from Bahla, controlled the caravan routes linking Omani ports (like Sohar) to inland oases, Bahrain, Baghdad, and Damascus, notably the Incense Route. This period of intense exchange was also marked by the introduction of the mango tree to Oman, evidencing trade links with the Indian subcontinent.
Islam, Ibadism, and the Invention of an Elective Imamate
The Islamic turning point arrived in the 7th century. According to tradition, the Prophet Muhammad dispatched his companion Amr ibn al-As to the two brothers Jaifer and Abd, sons of Julanda, who then governed the region. They converted, bringing the population of Oman with them. Quickly, the territory became an important center of the Ibadi school, a branch stemming from the Kharijite movement but considered more moderate.
Ibadism, whose doctrinal roots go back to the debate over the legitimacy of caliphs after the Battle of Siffin, advocates the election of the imam by the consultative community (ahl al-shûrâ) and the duty to oppose rulers deemed unjust. The theologian Jâbir ibn Zayd, a scholar from the Omani Azd tribe, played a key role in spreading these ideas in his homeland after a stay in Basra. Faced with repression by the Umayyad governor al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, many Ibadis retreated towards Oman, where they found fertile ground for experimenting with a power based on election and piety rather than heredity.
Around the mid-8th century, shortly after the fall of the Umayyads, what tradition considers Oman’s first elective imamate was established. Sources differ on the exact identity of the first imam – some propose Julanda bin Masud, others Janah bin ‘Ibada al-Hinnawi – but they agree on the novel nature of the system: the Ibadi religious leaders organized the election of a ruler tasked with applying sharia and defending the community, without claiming the caliphal dimension of the great contemporary dynasties.
In the 9th century, the Ibadi imamate of Oman, strong in its fleet and strategic position, established a maritime empire controlling the gulf. It traded with the Abbasid Caliphate, India, the Far East, and the Swahili coast. The ports of Sohar, Muscat, and Sur became major hubs for Arab, Indian, and Persian merchants, thus combining religious legitimacy and naval power.
From the 11th century onward, however, this model clashed with imperial ambitions. The country successively fell under the sway of the Iranian Buyids, then the Seljuks, who extended their influence over the Omani coast. The authority of the imams weakened, undermined by internal rivalries and external interventions. The arrival of the Nabhani dynasty in Bahla, from the mid-12th century, marked the return of hereditary dynastic power, even though the imamate tradition would periodically resurface over the centuries.
Oman, Crossroads of the Indian Ocean Sea Routes
Alongside these political realignments, Oman affirmed its maritime vocation. From the 3rd millennium BCE, Magan ships supplied Mesopotamia with copper. In the Pharaonic era, ships from Dhofar brought the incense necessary for worship to Egypt. Later, the Greco-Roman navigation manual known as the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea describes, in the 1st century CE, a structured trade system linking the ports of the Arabian Sea, India, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Omani ports played an intermediary role for spices, fabrics, and precious stones.
From the 4th century, Omani ships transported Chinese goods (silks, ceramics) to the Arabian Peninsula. Excavations at Sohar and Sur have confirmed these exchanges with the discovery of Chinese and Indian objects. Thanks to mastery of the monsoons and tools like the kamal, Omani sailors reached Chinese ports, notably Quanzhou, as early as the 9th century.
Wooden dhows – deep-sea baghlah, coastal jalboot – built on the Omani coast, particularly in Sur, became essential vectors of this trade. The tradition of shipbuilding was transmitted orally, without written plans, relying on the memory of master carpenters and intimate knowledge of wood species imported from India or Burma (teak) and local resources (acacia, ghaff). A large dhow requires several truckloads of wood, nine months to a year of work, and still mobilizes rare expertise today, even though fiberglass hulls and engines have relegated these vessels to tourist or prestige objects.
Historically, Omani ports have served as platforms for trade and cultural diffusion, connecting the Arab world to South and Southeast Asia over the long term.
Omani merchants and navigators participated in the gradual Islamization of the Indian coasts and the Malay Archipelago, diffusing commercial practices, urban models, and architectural forms.
This expansion is part of a historical continuity, from ancient links with the Indus civilization (Magan) to modern relations with independent India.
Beyond religion, Omani influence transmitted specific urban models and architectural forms to coastal regions of Asia.
The Portuguese Irruption and Omani Resistance
The end of the 15th century, however, saw the appearance of a new competitor in these waters: Portugal. After Vasco da Gama’s voyage, the Portuguese undertook military control of the Indian Ocean routes. In 1507, the troops of Afonso de Albuquerque seized several Omani ports, including Muscat, which became their principal regional base. They consolidated their grip by fortifying the capital with the forts of Jalali (São João) and Mirani (Almirante), and occupying Barka, Qalhat, Khasab, and other strategic points.
The Portuguese instituted a system of paid passes (cartaz) for merchant ships, attempting to monopolize traffic. They harshly repressed local revolts, like those in Sohar or Muscat in the early 16th century, and had to face Ottoman offensives several times. The capture of Hormuz by the Safavids, aided by the English East India Company, in 1622, marked a turning point: deprived of this major stronghold, the Portuguese regrouped their forces on the Omani coast, but their position was weakened.
It was in this context that the Yaruba dynasty emerged, starting in 1624. The first Ya‘rubi imam, Nasir bin Murshid, elected in Rustaq, undertook to unify the tribes and rebuild an Omani power capable of rivaling the Europeans. His successors continued the fight. Sohar was retaken in 1643, Julfar in 1633, Muscat was besieged in 1648 and then captured definitively in 1650. In less than half a century, the Portuguese were expelled from all Omani ports.
Far from being content with their liberation, the Omanis went on the offensive. Under Saif bin Sultan, the Omani fleet besieged Fort Jesus in Mombasa for nearly three years, until it fell in 1698. Pemba, Kilwa, Pate, Zanzibar, and other Swahili cities came under Omani influence, ending most Portuguese positions north of Mozambique. The empire that reformed from Muscat would no longer be just a Gulf actor, but a leading power on the entire eastern African seaboard.
The Rise and Fragilities of the Yaruba Empire
Beyond the struggle against Portugal, the Yaruba imams worked to strengthen the interior of the country. Saif bin Sultan developed agriculture by multiplying date palm plantations, especially in the Batinah plain, and by building aflaj, those gravity-fed irrigation channels that still structure the Omani oasis today. He made Rustaq his main residence, built a wind tower (Burj al Riah) there to cool the palace, and financed schools and mosques.
Number of warships constituting the ruler’s personal fortune at his death in 1711, illustrating his power.
This new foreign tutelage, after the Portuguese episode, provoked a backlash among the religious and tribal elites. It is in this climate of crisis that the rise of Ahmad bin Saïd Al Busaidi, the governor of Sohar, emerged.
Foundation of the Al Bu Said Dynasty and Recomposition of the State
When the Persian fleet besieged Sohar, Ahmad bin Saïd held the city for nine months. His fierce resistance finally forced the commander of Nader Shah to negotiate. In the following years, Persian forces gradually withdrew from the country. In recognition of his role in liberating the territory, Omani notables elected Ahmad bin Saïd as imam in November 1744. This event – which the country commemorates today as the “Day of the Founding of the Al Busaid Dynasty” – marks Oman’s entry into a new era.
For the first time, a lasting central power was established, capable of federating warring tribes and reconstituting military and naval instruments worthy of a regional state. It drove a policy of modernizing economic activities. Muscat regained and strengthened its status as a major commercial center: its port became, according to a report by the English East India Company at the end of the 18th century, one of the principal Asian cities, frequented by European ships.
Ahmad bin Saïd, founder of the Al Said dynasty
The Omani fleet was reborn under his reign, to the point of being considered the most powerful in the Indian Ocean after that of Great Britain. Capable of purging the region of the last Persian detachments, it even escorted Ottoman ships in the Gulf of Oman and off the so-called “Trucial” coast (present-day UAE). In 1775, Ahmad sent a squadron of about a hundred ships, including the large vessel Al-Taradh Al-Rahmani, to break the Persian siege of Basra at the request of the governor of Baghdad. The success of this operation reflected Oman’s return to prominence on the regional scene.
The Al Bu Said dynasty enacted a political shift: after Imam Ahmad, elected according to Ibadi tradition, his successors gradually abandoned the spiritual title of imam for those of sayyid and then sultan, thus recentering their legitimacy on temporal power. However, the family maintained a close link with the Ibadi heritage by continuing to support Muslim scholars and promote religious education.
From Rustaq to Muscat: A State Turned Toward the Sea
After the death of Ahmad bin Saïd in 1778, his son Saïd bin Ahmad succeeded him. Very religious but disinclined towards administrative tasks, he retired to Rustaq, leaving his son Hamad bin Saïd to de facto shift the center of power towards Muscat. In 1783, the capital was officially transferred from the mountainous interior to this ocean-facing port. Hamad took the title of sultan, implying coercive rather than spiritual power, and launched a series of reforms initiating the transition to a modern maritime state. His premature death in 1792, during a smallpox epidemic, opened a complex succession from which another family member, Sultan bin Ahmad, emerged victorious.
To strengthen his fleet and confront three major challenges – recapturing Mombasa, containing Wahhabi expansion, and limiting the incursions of the Qawasim – he forged a strategic alliance with Great Britain, then in global rivalry with Napoleonic France.
In 1798, a treaty of commerce and navigation was signed with the English East India Company. Sultan bin Ahmad committed to supporting British interests in India, to bar French ships from his ports, and authorized the opening of a British factory in Muscat. London thus gained a strategic foothold on the route to India, while Muscat gained protection against its regional adversaries. The British presence was strengthened with the installation of a consul, and later, a permanent political resident.
The “Golden Age” of Saïd bin Sultan and the Omani Indian Ocean Empire
The death of Sultan bin Ahmad in 1804, killed by a bullet during a naval action in the Gulf, plunged the country into a period of uncertainty. His eldest son, Saïd, was only 13. A cousin, Badr bin Saïf, took the regency, relying on the Wahhabis and seeking to consolidate his own authority. Very quickly, he clashed with the hostility of the rest of the family. At sixteen, Saïd organized his assassination in a scene that remains famous – a dagger duel at Bait al Nu’man, near Barka – and then definitively took the reins of power.
His long reign, until the mid-19th century, is often considered the zenith of Omani power. This warrior and merchant prince consolidated Muscat’s domination of the gulf and projected his authority over a vast domain stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to the coasts of Iran and Pakistan (up to Gwadar), and, especially, to a large portion of the Swahili coast down to Cape Delgado, in present-day Mozambique.
Saïd bin Sultan, nicknamed ‘Saïd the Great’
Convinced of the potential of Zanzibar, conquered at the turn of the 18th century, he transferred his principal residence there in the 1830s, while continuing to visit Muscat regularly. There he shaped the future Stone Town, capitalized on a favorable climate to introduce intensive clove cultivation – cloves, essential for meat preservation in Europe before refrigeration became widespread – and stimulated the production of sugarcane, rice, copal gum, and the export of ivory. To maximize the exploitation of these plantations, he relied heavily on slavery, making Zanzibar one of the largest African slave markets of the 19th century.
The commercial power of the Omani empire also relied on the presence of important Indian merchant communities, notably from Kutch and Gujarat. Some houses, like those of Jairam Shivji or Ladha Damji, became customs farmers-general and the sultan’s main financiers, illustrating the multi-ethnic character of this empire composed of Arab elites, Swahili administrators, Indian bankers, and African populations.
Saïd bin Sultan pursued an active diplomatic policy, signing a treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States in 1833 (their second with an Arab state) and with France in 1844, while consolidating the alliance with Great Britain. In 1840, the diplomatic mission of the ship Al-Sultanah to New York, led by Ahmad bin Na‘aman al-Kaabi, was the first from an Arab state to the United States, meeting federal authorities and figures like Cornelius Vanderbilt.
Table 1 – Milestones in Omani Imperial Ascent
| Period / Reign | Major Event | Historical Scope |
|---|---|---|
| Ahmad bin Saïd (mid-18th) | Breaks Persian siege of Basra, rebuilds fleet | Return of Oman as a regional naval power |
| Nasir & Saif bin Sultan (17th) | Expulsion of Portuguese, capture of Fort Jesus in Mombasa | Omani control of Swahili coast at Portugal’s expense |
| Saïd bin Sultan (19th) | Capital transferred to Zanzibar, clove empire | Apogee of Omani maritime empire in Indian Ocean |
| 1833–1840 | Treaty with USA, voyage of Al-Sultanah to New York | Integration of Oman into global diplomatic circuits |
This golden age was not, however, free of tensions. Within the peninsula itself, the sultan’s power, based on the sea, regularly clashed with interior tribes attached to the ideal of the imamate. Saïd bin Sultan, with British support, managed to contain Wahhabi attacks and rebellions, but the compromise remained fragile. The abolition of the slave trade by the British, which they sought to impose gradually on their ally, further threatened the economic foundations of the empire, largely built on slavery and ivory.
Partition of the Empire, British Protectorate, and Return of the Interior Imamate
The death of Saïd bin Sultan in 1856, during a sea voyage between Muscat and Zanzibar, provoked a profound succession crisis. His sons Thuwaini, governor of Muscat, and Majid, settled in Zanzibar, each claimed the entire inheritance. Majid, warned first, quickly consolidated his position in Zanzibar, while Thuwaini refused to recognize the separation.
To avoid a protracted war, the British Raj imposed the partition of the Omani empire in 1861 into two distinct sultanates: Zanzibar (ruled by Majid) and Muscat and Oman (ruled by Thuwaini). An annual subsidy from Zanzibar to Muscat, rarely honored, was planned to compensate for the loss of African revenues. This partition ended Oman’s imperial expansion, which retreated to the peninsula and gradually entered a phase of quasi-British protectorate.
As early as 1798, agreements with London had opened the way to increased political presence. Throughout the 19th century, a series of treaties consolidated this dependence. In 1891, an agreement effectively forbade the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman from establishing diplomatic relations without British approval, in exchange for protection against rivals. British officials occupied key posts in ministries, advised the sultan on defense, finances, and foreign affairs, and even obtained the cession of the Kuria Muria islands in 1854.
In 1913, the Ibadi imam Salim ibn Rashid al-Kharusi led a revolt in the mountainous interior against the Sultanate of Muscat, seen as too close to the British. The conflict led in 1920 to the Treaty of Seeb, negotiated under British mediation. This agreement formalized a partition: the sultan kept control of coastal cities and the littoral, while the imam obtained autonomous authority over the mountainous regions, with Nizwa as capital. Oman was thus divided into a maritime sultanate and an interior imamate.
Table 2 – Political Duality in the Early 20th Century
| Entity | Political Center | Basis of Legitimacy | Main External Allies |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sultanate | Muscat / Sur | Al Bu Said Dynasty, UK treaties | United Kingdom, oil companies |
| Interior Imamate | Nizwa / Rustaq | Ibadi election, tribal autonomy | Arab sympathies, later Egypt, Saudi Arabia |
This fragile balance was, however, challenged by a new issue: oil.
Oil, the Jebel Akhdar Wars, and the End of the Imamate
In 1937, a concession agreement was signed between the Sultan of Muscat and the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), a consortium dominated by Western majors. Exploration revealed that potential reserves were located in the area controlled by the imamate. IPC then proposed to finance the creation of an armed force to secure these territories. London, keen to guarantee access to the black gold in the postwar context, lent its support.
Following the death of Imam Muhammad al-Khalili in 1954, his successor Ghalib bin Ali al-Hinai inherited a tense political situation. Hostilities erupted when Sultan Saïd bin Taimur, supported by British military advisors, authorized oil prospecting near Fahud, in imamate territory. The Muscat and Oman Field Force, led by British officers, successively occupied Fahud, Tanam, Adam, and finally Nizwa at the end of 1955, leading to the official abolition of the imamate.
Resistance soon reorganized. Talib al-Hinai, the imam’s brother, took refuge in Saudi Arabia and then in Cairo, where he obtained support from nationalist Arab countries like Nasser’s Egypt or Iraq. Returning to Oman with fighters, he managed to retake several interior towns in 1957, aided by tribal leaders like Suleiman bin Himyar. Faced with this counter-offensive, London chose to use force. British troops, including the Cameronians regiment, were deployed; the Royal Air Force launched, from August 1957, bombing campaigns on mountain villages, deliberately targeting crops, irrigation systems (aflaj), and water points to break resistance capabilities.
The war, known as the Jebel Akhdar War, lasted until 1959. The intervention of British special forces (SAS), who scaled the cliffs of Jabal Akhdar by night to surprise rebel positions, sealed the sultan’s victory. The imamate leaders took refuge in Saudi Arabia. The Treaty of Seeb was unilaterally annulled, and the imamate no longer had institutional existence on Omani territory. The affair, brought before the United Nations by the imam’s Arab allies, led to resolutions critical of the United Kingdom, but with no immediate effect on the ground.
The Dhofar Insurgency and the 1970 Coup
Hardly was the Jebel Akhdar conflict over when another rebellion erupted, further south. In Dhofar, a mountainous region facing the Indian Ocean, marginalized by the central power and marked by ancient ties with neighboring Yemen, the opposition took on a radically different color. In 1963, a separatist movement, the Dhofar Liberation Front, formed. Initially inspired by Arab anti-colonialism, it gradually shifted towards militant Marxism, especially after the creation, in 1967, of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), a socialist regime that provided it with military and logistical support.
The Front transformed into the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), waging a guerrilla war against the forces of Sultan Saïd bin Taimur. The latter, who ascended the throne in 1932, ruled with an iron fist a country largely closed to the outside world. On the eve of the 1970s, Oman had only a handful of kilometers of paved roads, a single major hospital, very few schools – almost no secondary ones – and bans on such basic practices as wearing glasses in some regions. Most modern infrastructure (electricity, telecommunications, road networks) was non-existent outside Muscat. This situation fueled resentment in provinces like Dhofar.
In this context, London judged that the rigidity of the old sultan compromised the country’s stability and the fight against the Marxist insurgency, perceived as a risk in the context of the Cold War. In July 1970, a palace coup, planned with the participation of British services, deposed Saïd bin Taimur in favor of his son Qaboos, trained at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and in the British army. The takeover occurred in Salalah, following a brief exchange of gunfire in the palace.
Upon his accession to the throne in 1970, Sultan Qaboos undertook a profound transformation of the country. He unified the territory by renaming it the “Sultanate of Oman,” proclaimed a general amnesty, abolished the slave trade and slavery, and launched a vast modern development program financed by oil revenues, commercially exploited since 1967.
On the military front, he strengthened and modernized the armed forces, while continuing the war in Dhofar with new allies: the Shah’s Iran sent troops and aircraft; Hussein’s Jordan dispatched instructors, a battalion of special forces, and Hawker Hunter fighters; Great Britain engaged advisors and SAS units under the guise of training missions. A strategy of “winning hearts and minds” was implemented: integration of former insurgents into local militias (firqats), construction of roads and services in villages, opening of schools and clinics. By 1976, the rebellion was officially defeated.
The Qaboos “Renaissance”: Modernization and Cautious Opening
At the time of the 1970 coup, Oman was one of the poorest and most isolated countries in the region. Within a few decades, the country was profoundly transformed. Revenues from oil – whose production reached over 300,000 barrels per day in the early 1980s – financed roads, ports, airports, schools, universities, hospitals, drinking water, and electricity networks. An international airport and a major container port were built, notably in Salalah, which today ranks among the world’s most efficient ports according to World Bank indices.
The country went from 10 km of paved roads in 1970 to over 3000 km by the mid-1980s.
Muscat’s urban planning was subject to strict rules: traditional architecture, limited building height, landscape integration. The sultan insisted on preserving the capital’s aesthetics and avoiding the emergence of disorderly skyscrapers. He created the Royal Opera House, inaugurated in the early 21st century, a symbol of a refined cultural policy extending to the founding of a national symphony orchestra entirely composed of Omani musicians.
Oman is an absolute monarchy where the sultan historically concentrated the main executive and military powers. Legislation emanates from royal decrees. The regime gradually introduced mechanisms of supervised participation: a State Consultative Council (1981), then an elected Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura, 1991). The first written constitution (Basic Law of 1996) clarified succession rules. Political rights expanded with women’s right to vote and stand for election to the Majlis al-Shura in 1997, and the appointment of the first woman minister in 2004.
On the international stage, Oman adopted a policy of active neutrality. A founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981, the country nonetheless distinguished itself from its neighbors by refusing to systematically align with Saudi positions. Loyal to Iran for its help in the Dhofar war, Muscat maintained good relations with Tehran, refused to engage in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, and served several times as a mediator. Secret talks between the US and Iran, organized in Oman, led to the 2015 nuclear deal. The country also hosted hostage releases, financed ransoms, and periodically opened its doors to Israeli leaders, while reaffirming its support for the Palestinian cause.
Table 3 – Indicators of Transformation under Qaboos
| Domain | Circa 1970 (order of magnitude) | Circa late 2010s (order of magnitude) |
|---|---|---|
| Length of paved roads | ~10 km | > 3,000 km |
| Life expectancy | ~50 years | ~77 years |
| Access to school | Very limited, almost no secondary | Nearly universal schooling, universities created |
| Hospitals | 1 major hospital, a few clinics | Over 100 health facilities |
| Literacy | Predominantly illiterate | ~96% literacy rate |
This “Renaissance” (al-nahda), as termed by the regime, did not occur without criticism. NGOs denounced the closed nature of the political system, the absence of political parties, restrictions on freedom of expression, arrests of activists, notably during protests linked to the 2011 Arab Spring. The power responded with a mix of concessions (cabinet reshuffle, promises of reform) and targeted repression.
Dynastic Continuity and 21st Century Challenges
When Qaboos died in January 2020, after nearly five decades of rule, he had no direct heir. His will, opened by the Royal Family Council, designated his cousin Haitham bin Tariq as successor, in accordance with the rules set by the 1996 Basic Law. A former Minister of Heritage and Culture, familiar with development and diplomacy dossiers, Haitham embodies the continuity of the Al Bu Said dynasty, founded in 1744.
In 2021, the Omani monarchy instituted for the first time an explicit crown prince, Theyazin bin Haitham, formalizing succession by the eldest son to strengthen predictability and stability. Concurrently, the sultan maintained the country’s traditional foreign policy, based on neutrality, mediation, and maintaining good relations with all its partners, from the United Kingdom (historical partner) to India, the United States, Iran, and European countries.
Economically, the major challenge lies in dependence on hydrocarbons. Oil reserves, revised downward as early as 2004, suggest a limited exploitation horizon of a few decades. While a temporary increase in crude prices helped reduce the budget deficit after 2020, the need to diversify the economy remains pressing. Vision 2040, the national development strategy, attempts to steer the country towards services, logistics, tourism, the development of ports like Duqm or Salalah, and attracting massive foreign investment, including via partnerships with China or the United Kingdom.
Youth unemployment in Oman is approaching 30%, according to some estimates.
A Long History, a Singular Identity
The history of the country in Oman is distinguished by a remarkable continuity: that of a space which, since the time of Magan, has never ceased to be turned towards the sea and to maintain exchanges with distant regions. From the supply of copper and incense to Mesopotamian and Egyptian temples to the conquest of Zanzibar and the Swahili coast; from the Ibadi imamate, an original political experiment based on the election of the ruler, to the long domination of the Al Bu Said dynasty, the Omani journey combines tribal roots and cosmopolitan openness.
Oman is distinguished by Ibadism, a moderate religious path that is the majority in the country, known for its doctrinal conservatism but also for its rejection of extremism. This singularity is reflected in its contemporary diplomacy, often compared to that of Switzerland in the Gulf, as it systematically favors mediation over confrontation.
If oil and gas exploitation provided Oman with the means to build a modern state in record time, it also exposes it to economic vulnerabilities it will need to overcome. But the country seems to draw, from its millennial history of resilience in the face of Persian, Portuguese, Ottoman, or British empires, the capacity to reinvent its models while preserving a strong national consciousness. Herein lies perhaps the key to its trajectory: a delicate balance, always, between continuity and adaptation, between memory and projection towards the future.
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Cyril Jarnias is an independent expert in international wealth management with over 20 years of experience. As an expatriate himself, he is dedicated to helping individuals and business leaders build, protect, and pass on their wealth with complete peace of mind.
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