Gambia’s History: From Precolonial Kingdoms to Democratic Transition

Published on April 30, 2026 and written by Cyril Jarnias

The history of the country in Gambia is much richer than the small size of this territory, wedged into the meanders of the Gambia River and entirely surrounded by Senegal except for its opening onto the Atlantic, might suggest. From the mysterious construction of megalithic circles to the fight against slavery, from British colonization to the long reign of Sir Dawda Jawara, then to the dictatorship of Yahya Jammeh and the democratic shift embodied by Adama Barrow, the Gambian political journey summarizes in miniature many of the great African dramas: the Atlantic slave trade, colonial domination, the fragile post-independence state, military coups, and the slow construction of democratic institutions.

Good to know:

The history of Gambia is a long story that begins before the arrival of Europeans, traverses the West African empires, then the colonial and postcolonial periods up to the recent constitutional debates. Despite its small size, its strategic position on a highly navigable river made it a commercial crossroads, a corridor of the slave trade, a colonial bridgehead, and, more recently, a laboratory for democratic transition in West Africa.

From Ancient Societies to West African Empires

Long before the appearance of modern borders, the Gambia River valley was home to organized societies. Archaeologists have identified large shell mounds, burial tumuli, and above all a vast set of stone circles there, some dating back nearly a millennium. These lithic pillars, sometimes two meters high and weighing up to seven tons, were carved with iron tools and erected, for the most part, between the 11th and the end of the 13th century. The complexes of Wassu and its surroundings bear witness to a civilization that mastered both metallurgy, monumental architecture, and sophisticated funerary rituals.

Note:

Researchers debate the identity of the builders (Serer, Soos, Mandinka-speaking populations), but these remains prove that the history of Gambia, with its complex African societies, precedes the arrival of Europeans.

From the first millennium, the region became part of the great history of the West African empires. First partially integrated into the influence of the Ghana Empire between the 5th and 11th centuries, it then came under the orbit of Mali from the 13th century. A general of Soundiata Keïta, Tiramakhan Traoré, led a campaign westward, defeated the king of Jolof, and installed his descendants in the province of Kaabu, which radiated over the upper Gambia River. Mandinka warriors and merchants founded or took control of several small states along the banks.

The kingdoms of Niani, Wuli, Foni, Kombo, Fulladou, and Sine-Saloum structured local political life. Tradition attributes the founding of the kingdom of Wuli to the semi-legendary figure of Mbari Kajo Wali. But none of these powers were strong enough to dominate all of Senegambia for long, which later left the field open for European interference.

Example:

From the 9th and 10th centuries, Arab sources mention the region. Trans-Saharan trade developed, where Arab-Berber merchants exchanged gold, ivory, and captives for manufactured goods. Islam gradually spread, first reaching the royal courts of Takrur, Ghana, and Gao, before taking root among the local elites of the Gambia area between the 11th and 12th centuries.

Between the 14th and 16th centuries, the political configuration constantly evolved. The Jolof Empire, founded in the 1360s by Ndiadiane Ndiaye, subjugated several Mandinka states on the north bank, such as Niumi, Baddibu, Nyani, and Wuli. At the turn of the 16th century, the Fulani chief Tenguella and his son Koli controlled vast territories from Fouta-Djalon, threatening Wuli and Niani, before being defeated by the Songhai Empire in 1512. After the Battle of Danki in 1549, Jolof collapsed, while Mali definitively disintegrated at the end of the 16th century. The region, entangled with rival kingdoms, nonetheless remained an essential crossroads for trans-Saharan trade.

The Atlantic Slave Trade: The River as a Corridor of Deportation

When Portuguese navigators reached the mouth of the river in the second half of the 15th century, the history of the country in Gambia shifted into a new era. The Venetian Alvise Ca’ da Mosto, in the service of Infante Henry the Navigator, traveled up the river in 1455. The Portuguese established trading posts along the banks, monopolizing trade between Senegal and Gambia until the 16th century. However, their settlements remained limited, and after a few generations, the most precarious posts were abandoned, even though Luso-African descendants remained.

Gradually, other European powers entered the game. English merchants obtained exclusive trading rights on the river in 1588, ceded by António, Prior of Crato, and validated by the English crown. In 1618, a royal privilege granted an English company the authority to trade with Gambia and the Gold Coast. The Dutch and other maritime nations soon established themselves there as well.

Good to know:

From the 16th to the 19th century, the navigable Gambia River served as a major corridor for the slave trade to the Americas. Europeans relied on African intermediaries (kings, chiefs, notables) who exchanged captives for goods (weapons, textiles, alcohol). James Island (Kunta Kinteh) was a key transshipment point.

Estimates of the number of people taken from the region vary, but all converge on the scale of the disaster. Historian Philip D. Curtin estimates that in Senegambia, approximately 304,000 people were deported between 1681 and 1810, with peaks of over 4,000 deported per year in the mid-18th century. Boubacar Barry, for his part, cites an average of about 6,000 captives annually for the entire century. On the scale of Africa, we speak of about 12 million Africans forcibly sent across the Atlantic.

He describes columns of 30 to 40 people chained by the neck, marching toward the ships. Villages like Juffure, in the heart of the kingdom of Niumi, prosper for a time as slave trade relay points before paying, with the rest of the region, the social price of this captive economy.

Francis Moore, British merchant from the 1730s

The consequences for the history of the country in Gambia are profound: disrupted families, decimated communities, chronic violence from raids, collapse of traditional economic structures, massive loss of human capital. The slave trade exacerbated local conflicts, weakened kingdoms, and prepared the ground for more direct foreign domination.

Comparative Data on the Slave Trade in Senegambia

Even if the numbers differ, they paint the same picture: a territory with a small structural population subjected to a colossal human drain.

From Abolition to the “Legitimate” Colonial Economy

In 1807, the British Parliament abolished the Atlantic slave trade. The Royal Navy patrolled the coast of West Africa to intercept slave ships. Liberated captives – the Liberated Africans – were often resettled in Sierra Leone, then sometimes sent to Gambia. It is estimated that between 1808 and 1896, about 250,000 people were thus freed in the region, with more than 4,000 transferred to Gambia between 1832 and 1843. In Bathurst, mortality was terrible: more than a thousand died in the early years, with survivors often placed in apprenticeship, in conditions close to serfdom.

1816

Year of the treaty ceding Banjul Island to British Captain Alexander Grant, marking the founding of Bathurst and the establishment of colonial power in Gambia.

Soon, other fortifications appeared, such as the Six-Gun Battery (1816) and Fort Bullen (1826), positioned at the river mouth to monitor ships. But the Atlantic abolition did not end all forms of slavery: on the contrary, the reorientation of the economy toward cash crops, particularly groundnuts, led to an intensification of forced labor inland. Local elites, destabilized by the end of the external slave trade, tried to maintain their power by other means, while the colonial administration was being set up.

Building the British Colony: Strategic River, Groundnut Economy

Throughout the 19th century, the British presence strengthened. Administratively, Gambia was integrated into the colony of Sierra Leone between 1821 and 1843, then became a distinct territory with its own governor, before being reattached to Freetown between 1866 and 1889. This administrative waltz reflects London’s hesitations: considered unprofitable, the Gambian possession was several times offered in exchange to France in the 1860s-1870s. Opposition from merchants and local populations, as well as the strategic stakes of the river, prevented the cession.

On the ground, the British extended their control through a series of treaties with local chiefs. Lemain (MacCarthy) Island was ceded in 1823 by King Collie and became Georgetown, a military and resettlement center for freed slaves. In 1826, a strip of land to the north, the “Ceded Mile,” was acquired from the King of Barra. Fattatenda and its surroundings joined the British domain in 1829. Other acquisitions took place in the 1840s and 1850s near Bathurst, always in the form of concessions in exchange for protection.

Tip:

The elongated and narrow shape of present-day Gambia results from an imperial compromise between France and Great Britain in 1889. This Paris Agreement assigned to Great Britain control of the Gambia River up to Yarbutenda, as well as a strip of territory 10 to 16 km wide on either side of the watercourse, entirely landlocked within the then French-controlled Senegal.

The colonial economy very quickly relied on a monoculture: groundnuts. Under the impetus of the administration and British trading houses, this crop gradually replaced other food productions. Groundnuts became by far the main export product to Europe, permanently placing the country in a position of dependence on a single product. This specialization, reinforced in the 1950s as a source of foreign exchange, left the peasantry vulnerable to fluctuations in international prices and reduced food self-sufficiency. At the same time, smuggling trades developed toward Senegal to circumvent colonial taxes.

Good to know:

British political domination was exercised under two distinct regimes. In the ‘Colony’ (Bathurst, Bakau, Serekunda, Georgetown and a limited perimeter), the regime was direct: inhabitants, considered ‘British subjects,’ were subject to colonial law and had very little representation. In the rest of the territory, proclaimed a Protectorate in 1894, ‘indirect rule’ prevailed: the country was divided into divisions and districts, with chiefs (Seyfu) and village heads (Alkali) responsible for order and tax collection under colonial supervision. This structure, codified by ordinances in the early 20th century, reinforced the power of the chiefs, sometimes in an authoritarian manner, and froze social hierarchies useful to the metropolis.

In practice, colonization established a system of extraction with few investments. It was not until the British 1940 law on “Colonial Welfare and Development” that a few projects saw the light: hospitals in Banjul and Bansang, Armitage High School in Georgetown, Clifton Road (Independence Drive). At independence, infrastructure remained meager, and the rural economy was largely impoverished.

The Rise of Nationalism and the Path to Independence

Despite the poverty of the country, anticolonial ideas progressed from the 1920s. Edward Francis Small, a pioneering figure, founded a newspaper, The Gambia Outlook, as well as a union and a taxpayers’ association in Bathurst, to denounce colonial exploitation, unfair taxation, and lack of representation. He became, under the 1947 Constitution, the first Gambian elected to a seat.

As the Second World War ended, London faced growing political demands in West Africa. In Gambia, a series of constitutional reforms gradually opened the way to self-government. The 1960 Constitution created a partially elected House of Representatives, with 19 members elected by direct suffrage and 8 appointed by the Protectorate chiefs. The 1960 elections resulted in a tie: the two main parties – the United Party of Pierra Sarr N’Jie and the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) of Dawda Jawara – each won eight seats. Supported by the unelected representatives of the chiefs, N’Jie was appointed Chief Minister, while Jawara, Minister of Education, resigned in protest, deeming the formula unfair.

Toward Self-Government and Independence of Gambia

Key steps in Gambia’s constitutional and political evolution at the end of the British colonial period.

Constitutional Conference

In response to a crisis, London convened a conference that resulted in a new fundamental law, increasing the proportion of elected members and Gambian powers.

PPP Electoral Victory

In the 1962 elections, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) won a majority of seats, and Dawda Jawara became Prime Minister.

Internal Self-Government

In 1963, the colony obtained almost complete internal self-government, with Great Britain retaining defense, foreign affairs, and monetary policy.

The decisive step was taken at the Marlborough House conference in 1964. A delegation led by Jawara negotiated with the Colonial Secretary, Duncan Sandys, the conditions for attaining sovereignty. The Gambia Independence Act was passed in London and took effect on February 18, 1965: the territory of the colony and the protectorate merged into an independent state within the Commonwealth.

The new country remained a constitutional monarchy: Queen Elizabeth II remained head of state, represented by a Governor-General (Sir John Warburton Paul, then Sir Farimang Mamadi Singateh), while Jawara exercised executive power as Prime Minister. The fundamental laws guaranteed rights and freedoms, but supreme legal sovereignty remained in London, with the possibility of appeal to the Privy Council.

Two Referendums to Become a Republic

In the eyes of many Gambians, this independence was incomplete. The fact that formal sovereignty resided in a foreign monarchy, with no historical or cultural link to the country, appeared as a vestige of domination. The 1965 Constitution explicitly states that Parliament consists of “Her Majesty and the House of Representatives,” and reserves for the Governor-General the possibility of dissolving Parliament and appointing judges.

Good to know:

In 1965, a first referendum on establishing a republic garnered 65.85% of favorable votes but failed because it did not reach the required two-thirds threshold. Prime Minister Dawda Jawara respected this result without trying to circumvent the popular will, a restraint later cited as an example of democratic leadership.

Under pressure from public opinion and his own party, a second referendum was organized in April 1970. This time, 70.45% of voters supported the transformation into a republic. On April 24, 1970, the Constitution was amended, the monarchy abolished, and Dawda Jawara became the first President of the Republic of Gambia. It is at this date that some historians and political actors consider independence fully achieved, as sovereignty was no longer shared with London.

Political Framework at the Dawn of the Republic

The young state then operated under a parliamentary model inspired by Westminster, with a multi-party system quickly dominated by Jawara’s PPP.

The Jawara Era: Rare Democracy and Structural Fragility

For nearly a quarter of a century, from 1962 to 1994, Dawda Jawara embodied the Gambian state. From Prime Minister to President, he was re-elected several times, while his party won the legislative elections of 1966, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992. On the African continent, where military dictatorships and single parties multiplied, Gambia appeared as a democratic exception: relatively free elections, tolerated opposition, moderately active press. The first failed republican referendum, accepted without fraud, was long cited as an example of electoral honesty.

However, this picture has its shadows. The uncontested dominance of the PPP for three decades resulted in a de facto “quasi-single party,” even though the country formally remained multi-party. Formations like the United Party, the Democratic Party, the Muslim Congress Party, and later the Democratic Congress alliance struggled to challenge the rural hegemony of the PPP, firmly rooted among the Mandinka peasantry and the Protectorate chieftaincies.

Economically, Gambia remained trapped in groundnut monoculture. The 1970s saw some growth, but from the end of that decade and especially in the 1980s, falling prices, budget imbalances, and structural weaknesses led to a deep crisis. An ambitious Economic Recovery Program (ERP) was launched in the mid-1980s, with support from international donors. While some reforms stabilized finances and renewed engagement with donors, they also involved subsidy cuts, austerity for rural populations, and increased inequality.

Scandals tainted public enterprises, such as the Gambia Commercial Development Bank, unable to recover dubious loans. Talk at the time was of a “Banjul Mafia” grouping directors of public companies and businessmen close to power, accused of misappropriating public resources. Corruption, which many believed was limited to the top, spread through the senior administration. Jawara himself is rarely described as personally voracious, but his inner circle tolerated, even fueled, a system of clientelism linking politicians, civil servants, and merchants.

The Trauma of the Failed 1981 Coup and the Senegambia Confederation

The stability of the Jawara era was brutally challenged in late July 1981. While the President was in London attending the wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana, a former unsuccessful legislative candidate, Kukoi Samba Sanyang, a self-proclaimed Marxist, launched a coup d’état with a group called the National Revolutionary Council. Elements of the paramilitary force, the Field Force, joined the attempt. They occupied public buildings, announced the fall of the regime, and denounced corruption and the high cost of living.

2700

Number of Senegalese soldiers deployed on August 6 to crush the putsch in Gambia.

The political response took the form of an unprecedented institutional rapprochement with Senegal. In December 1981, Presidents Jawara and Abdou Diouf signed treaties in Dakar establishing the Senegambia Confederation. Officially proclaimed on February 1, 1982, it provided for a confederal president (Diouf) and vice-president (Jawara), a confederal parliament and government, and a common army. The objective was both to guarantee the security of the small Gambian state and to lay the groundwork for deeper integration.

Note:

Political divergences, imbalances between partners, and debates over the division of powers undermined the union. Nationalist resentments and Gambia’s withdrawal in 1989 led to the dissolution of the Confederation after eight years of existence.

Despite this failure, bilateral cooperation with Senegal remained close, both security-wise and economically. However, the events of 1981 left a lasting imprint: they showed the vulnerability of the Gambian state, the centrality of the army in crises, and the dependence on the Senegalese neighbor for the regime’s survival.

The 1994 Coup: End of the “Democratic Exception”

In the early 1990s, Gambia was both hailed as one of the rare parliamentary democracies in sub-Saharan Africa and criticized for its economic stagnation, rising corruption, and the gap between urban elites and the rural population. Within the army, discontent grew, fueled by disparities in treatment between Nigerian officers, seconded to command the Gambian Armed Forces, and young local officers, poorly paid and sometimes behind on their pay.

A scandal broke out in late 1993: three senior officials were accused of embezzling millions from union funds. The Assets Management and Recovery Commission, created in 1992 to recover debts, faced resistance from the executive. An inquiry opened after Jawara’s overthrow would reveal the extent of embezzlement and dysfunction.

Example:

On July 22, 1994, a group of young officers led by Captain Yahya Jammeh, then 29 years old, overthrew the Gambian government. The remarkably bloodless coup saw the takeover of the airport, national radio, and the power plant. The only reported direct casualty was a dog shot by mistake. President Dawda Jawara, in power since 1970, was forced to flee. He first took refuge on a US Navy ship, the *La Moure County*, before going into exile in Dakar, Senegal.

The putschists justified their action by denouncing corruption, nepotism, and the “weakness” of the civilian regime. They formed a military council, the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), with Jammeh as chairman, and immediately suspended the 1970 Constitution, dissolved the government, and banned all political parties. Among the main officers were Sana Sabally, Sadibou Hydara, and Edward Singateh, joined for a time by Basiru Barrow, Alhaji Kanteh, and Alpha Kinteh, the latter two nevertheless withdrawing from the plot.

Good to know:

The international community, notably the EU and the United States, suspended aid to demand a return to constitutional order. Unlike its intervention in 1981, Senegal refrained this time. In the context of democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, this coup was perceived as a regression.

From Junta to the Presidency of Yahya Jammeh

The new military power promised a transition to a civilian regime once corruption was curbed. Initially, the Council spoke of a four-year period. Ad hoc institutions emerged, such as the National Consultative Commission (NCC), created in December 1994, which recommended in January 1995 reducing the transition to two years. Simultaneously, a constitutional revision process was launched: a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) was appointed in April 1995 and submitted its report in November of the same year.

70

Percentage of approval for the new Constitution in the referendum of August 8, 1996.

Jammeh formally left the army in September 1996, after being promoted to colonel in late August, and founded his own party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC). Presidential elections were held in September 1996. According to official results, Jammeh won with about 56% of the vote, ahead of lawyer Ousainou Darboe, Hamat Bah, and Sidia Jatta. International observers immediately denounced the poll as “neither free nor fair,” pointing to intimidation, notably by an informal paramilitary group nicknamed the “Green Boys,” and media control.

Nevertheless, part of the population, weary of economic problems and the aging of the Jawara system, initially welcomed this “new order” with some hope. A study by political scientist John Wiseman would later show that many Gambians, who publicly displayed support for the junta, expressed disagreement in private. But the climate of fear limited critical expression.

Key Election Results Under Jammeh

Jammeh would be re-elected in 2001, 2006, and 2011, consolidating a presidency of 22 years.

The Jammeh Regime: Authoritarianism, Human Rights Violations, and Isolation

Very quickly, the regime of Yahya Jammeh showed its true face: hyper-personalized power, repressive, punctuated by communication stunts and spectacular decisions. The head of state adorned himself with a pompous title – “His Excellency Sheikh Professor Al Hajj Doctor Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh” – and even claimed to possess herbal remedies for AIDS or infertility, fueling a bewildering cult of personality.

Institutionally, the 1997 Constitution concentrated significant powers in the hands of the president, who appointed judges, members of the Electoral Commission, nominated parliamentarians, and could form and dissolve governments at will. More than 120 ministers were thus appointed or dismissed according to his whims, installing chronic instability at the top of the state.

Note:

On the ground, repression was organized around intelligence services (NIA), paramilitary units like the ‘Junglers’ (accused of being a death squad under Jammeh’s direct authority), and groups of violent young militants like the Green Boys. Political opponents, journalists, trade unionists, and human rights activists were the primary targets.

Attacks on press freedom multiplied. Laws like the Newspaper Act (1994), the National Media Communication Act (2000), amendments to the Penal Code (2004) and the Newspaper Act the same year imposed draconian conditions on media outlets. In 1998, the independent radio station Citizen FM was closed, its equipment seized, its employees arrested. The daily The Daily Observer, after its sale in 1999 to a businessman close to the regime, turned into a mouthpiece for presidential propaganda.

Meanwhile, arbitrary arrests, torture, and disappearances became commonplace. Opposition figures, such as lawyer Amadou Sanneh of the UDP party, were imprisoned and tortured. Journalists like Deyda Hydara were murdered, others like Ebrima Manneh or Musa Saidykhan disappeared or suffered severe abuse. People accused of homosexuality, in a context of highly repressive laws, were subjected to harassment campaigns and arbitrary detention.

Good to know:

In 2005, about 50 to 60 West African migrants, mainly Ghanaians, were arrested and summarily executed in Gambia by members of the army and the ‘Junglers.’ These facts, long denied, were confirmed by investigations by Human Rights Watch, TRIAL International, and the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC).

In 2009, a witch hunt campaign, encouraged by the government, led to the abduction of about a thousand people, suspected of occult practices after the death of Jammeh’s aunt, which he attributed to witchcraft. The victims, often elderly, were forcibly taken, forced to ingest brews, sometimes beaten, and several died as a result of these treatments.

Externally, he progressively isolated the country: withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 2013, denouncing it as a ‘neocolonial’ organization; unilateral proclamation of the ‘Islamic Republic’ in 2015, despite constitutional secularism; and a process of withdrawal from the International Criminal Court in 2016. Relations with Senegal also became strained, due to border disputes, unilateral tariff hikes, and suspicions of support for Casamance rebels.

Yahya Jammeh, former president of Gambia

All this took place in a landscape where attempts at coups d’état followed one another. Several aborted plots were reported in 2000, 2006, and 2014. In March 2006, while Jammeh was in Mauritania, a putsch attempt led by Chief of Staff Ndure Cham failed; Cham fled to Senegal, and ten former officers were convicted in 2007, four of them to life imprisonment. On December 30, 2014, a group led by Lieutenant Colonel Lamin Sanneh attacked the presidential palace in Banjul, while Jammeh was abroad; the assault was bloodily repelled.

Economically and socially, Gambia remained one of the poorest countries in the world. The economy remained largely agricultural, dependent on groundnuts, tourism, and remittances from the diaspora. Despite some infrastructure achievements – two high schools, five middle schools, a large rural hospital, several health centers, the first television station – poor governance, corruption, and rights violations drove away capital and talent.

The 2016 Election and Constitutional Crisis: Historic Turning Point

After 22 years in power, Jammeh stood for the presidential election of December 1, 2016, in a climate of increased repression. In the spring, opposition activists demanded electoral reforms. On April 14, Solo Sandeng, an organizer for the United Democratic Party (UDP), led a peaceful protest. Arrested by NIA agents, he died in custody after severe torture. Other protesters, including party leader Ousainou Darboe, were arrested, tried, and sentenced to three years in prison for participating in unauthorized gatherings. Jammeh, when questioned about deaths in custody, dismissed the subject, explaining that these were “very common” occurrences.

Despite these conditions, seven opposition parties managed to unite behind a single candidate, Adama Barrow, under the banner of the “Coalition 2016 for Change.” Only Mamma Kandeh, a former APRC member, chose to run separately at the head of the Gambia Democratic Congress (GDC). An agreement with the Electoral Commission provided for counting directly at polling stations to limit fraud.

The election took place in a tense but largely non-violent atmosphere, although authorities cut off internet and SMS access on election day and limited the presence of international observers (ECOWAS was even kept away). On December 2, to general surprise, the results gave victory to Adama Barrow, with about 43.3% of the vote (after correction), against 39.6% for Jammeh and 17.1% for Kandeh. The final margin was 3.7 points. The BBC described it as one of the most spectacular electoral upsets in recent West African history.

Example:

In December 2016, after his electoral defeat, outgoing President Yahya Jammeh called his successor Adama Barrow on national television to congratulate him, publicly acknowledging his loss. This event triggered massive celebrations in the streets of Banjul, perceived as the end of a dictatorship. Shortly afterwards, nineteen political prisoners, including opposition figure Ousainou Darboe, were released. This sequence marked the first peaceful transfer of power through the ballot box since the 1994 coup and even since the country’s independence in 1965.

But this moment of euphoria was short-lived. On December 9, Jammeh reversed his concession in a televised address, claiming to have discovered “unacceptable” irregularities in the electoral process. He demanded a new election under the auspices of an “independent and God-fearing” electoral commission. His party, the APRC, filed a case with the Supreme Court on December 13 to have the results annulled. However, the Court had been dysfunctional since 2015 due to a lack of sufficient judges. The Chief Justice, Nigerian Emmanuel Oluwasegun Fagbenle, indicated that it would take until May, or even November 2017, to hear the case.

On December 13, soldiers occupied the premises of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), blocking access to its chairman and staff. Security forces were deployed in Banjul and Serekunda. Adama Barrow took refuge in a safe location, as neither police nor the army were willing to provide him protection as president-elect. The Gambian Bar Association reacted vigorously, meeting in emergency session on December 12. It described the rejection of results as “treason,” called for the resignation of Chief Justice Fagbenle for gross misconduct and lack of independence, accusing him of campaigning for Jammeh and interfering in judicial decisions. Other organizations – teachers’ union, press association, university, medical association, Supreme Islamic Council – called on Jammeh to accept defeat.

describes Jammeh’s refusal as an outrageous act of contempt for the will of the Gambian people

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon

On December 23, ECOWAS announced that a military intervention was being considered if Jammeh had not handed over power by the end of his mandate, January 19, 2017. The President of the ECOWAS Commission, Marcel Alain de Souza, stated that Senegal would lead the operation, with a regional force already on alert. The AU warned that it would stop recognizing Jammeh as president from January 19.

Faced with these pressures, Jammeh dug in his heels. In his New Year’s speech, he accused ECOWAS of illegal interference, spoke of a “declaration of war” against Gambia, and lambasted the UN and AU. On January 17, two days before the official end of his term, he declared a 90-day state of emergency, citing unprecedented foreign interference. Parliament, where the APRC had a majority, voted on January 18 to extend his term by three more months.

This flight forward caused an exodus. Between 26,000 and 45,000 people – a large majority of them children – fled to Senegal or Guinea-Bissau, fearing an armed conflict. The Gambian army, meanwhile, was divided. The Chief of Staff, General Ousman Badjie, stated on January 18 that his troops would not fight a foreign intervention to overthrow Jammeh, then eventually swore allegiance to Barrow.

7000

Number of soldiers deployed by ECOWAS during Operation ‘Restore Democracy’ in Gambia in January 2017.

The UN Security Council adopted resolution 2337, supporting ECOWAS efforts to uphold the election result, but insisted on giving priority to political means. Without explicitly authorizing the use of force, the text did not condemn it either, leaving ECOWAS room for maneuver, especially since the intervention was legally based on the official invitation of the recognized president, Adama Barrow.

Under the combined pressure of the military threat, the massive flight of the population, and the gradual abandonment by his entourage, Jammeh finally agreed to negotiate. Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and Guinean President Alpha Condé played a key role in these final talks, supported by ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN. On the night of January 20-21, Jammeh announced on television that he was relinquishing power “in the interest of the Gambian people.” The same day, he left Banjul for Guinea, then went into exile in Equatorial Guinea.

ECOWAS maintained a contingent of 4,000 soldiers in the country to secure Banjul and key strategic sites. The state of emergency was lifted on January 24. Adama Barrow returned to Gambia on January 26 and requested that the regional force, now renamed ECOMIG, remain for several months to stabilize the situation and support security sector reform.

The crisis, which lasted from December 9, 2016 to January 21, 2017 – one month, one week, and five days – concluded without widespread bloodshed, but at the cost of a risk of armed conflict narrowly avoided. For ECOWAS and the AU, it was an emblematic victory for the doctrine of “zero tolerance” for unconstitutional changes of government. For Gambia, it was a historic turning point: the first truly democratic alternation of power since independence.

The Barrow Transition: Democratic Hopes, Slow Pace, and Challenges

Once Yahya Jammeh was out of the country, the task of institutional reconstruction began. Adama Barrow inherited a state whose institutions had been hollowed out, justice instrumentalized, the press muzzled, and security forces compromised in numerous abuses. The population aspired both to freedom, justice for past crimes, and rapid improvement in living conditions.

Among the first flagship measures was the creation, in December 2017, of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC), tasked with investigating human rights violations committed between 1994 and 2016. From 2018, the commission held public hearings, heard more than a hundred witnesses, including former Junglers, NIA officials, torture victims, and relatives of the disappeared. The accounts confirmed the scale of the abuses: enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, rapes, acts of torture, witch hunts, murders of migrants.

In November 2021, the TRRC submitted its report to President Barrow. Published in December, the document concluded that Yahya Jammeh and his inner circle were responsible for serious crimes, including crimes against humanity, and recommended prosecution before an international or hybrid tribunal. In May 2022, the government accepted most of the recommendations, committing to establish a transitional justice mechanism, compensate victims, and reform institutions.

At the same time, a National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), compliant with the Paris Principles, was established in December 2017 and became operational in 2019, with five commissioners. The state adopted a National Human Rights Policy and a 2021-2025 action plan. Freedom of expression saw clear improvement: media outlets multiplied, criticism of the government was heard, arbitrary arrests of journalists became rarer, although concerning incidents still occurred, such as the arrest of journalists for “fake news” in 2024 or the suspension of new radio licenses.

On the electoral front, the polls organized since 2017 – the 2021 presidential election, the 2022 legislative elections, the 2023 local elections – were generally deemed free and peaceful by observers, even though recommendations from the European Union to improve the legal framework (party financing, diaspora voting, continuous voter registration, reform of criminal defamation law) have been slow to implement.

Good to know:

The political landscape is being reshaped around President Adama Barrow. After breaking with the UDP coalition that brought him to power, he founded the National Peoples’ Party (NPP). The latter became the pivot of a “pro-Barrow” camp, notably thanks to a controversial alliance with a faction of the former APRC party of ex-President Jammeh, a decision that shocked many victims of the former regime. The UDP remains the main opposition force, while the previously dominant parties from before 1994, such as the PPP, no longer have significant representation in the National Assembly.

In December 2021, Barrow was re-elected with 53.2% of the vote, confirming a certain popularity but also the persistence of a vote structured more by geographic, ethnic, or personal loyalties than by ideological divides. Gambian parties almost all describe themselves as democratic and favorable to a market economy, without major opposing platforms.

However, the initial enthusiasm of the “new era” has faded. Poverty remains endemic, infrastructure insufficient, unemployment high. Allegations of corruption have touched public officials. The early dismissal of the Auditor General, who had conducted several high-profile audits and set up an internal investigation unit, sparked an uproar, youth protests, and a case before the Supreme Court. Anti-corruption activists denounce a setback in transparency. An anti-corruption law was passed, as was a law on access to information, but their concrete application remains pending, with the Anti-Corruption Authority still to be fully deployed.

On the security front, the continued presence of the regional force ECOMIG, led primarily by Senegal, has become unpopular with part of the population, especially after serious incidents such as the death of a protester in Kanilai in 2017 from Senegalese soldiers’ bullets. Many see it as an instrument to protect the Barrow regime rather than a reform tool. Yet, the persistent mistrust between the presidency and the national army, marked by the legacy of coups d’état, makes a hasty exit of ECOMIG delicate.

The Battle for the Constitution: Between Jammeh’s Legacy and Promises of a “New Gambia”

One of the most emblematic issues of the transition is constitutional reform. The 1997 Constitution, drafted under military auspices, concentrates vast powers in the hands of the executive, allowing it to appoint parliamentarians, judges, and the chairman of the Electoral Commission without real checks and balances. From 2016, the commitment to repeal this text and adopt a new one was at the heart of the Barrow coalition’s platform.

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The CRC draft, aimed at limiting presidential terms and strengthening powers, failed in the National Assembly due to a lack of a three-quarters majority. The main obstacle was the issue of retroactivity of term limits, perceived by some as a maneuver to prevent President Barrow from running again.

In 2024, a new draft Constitution was prepared by the Ministry of Justice. It retained the idea of a two-term limit, but removed retroactivity, opening the way for a possible Barrow candidacy beyond 2026. The text also removed several safeguards contained in the 2020 draft, notably the requirement for parliamentary approval for certain important appointments (ministers, heads of the electoral body, independent authorities), and granted the president unilateral power to dismiss nominated members of parliament. It also proposed extending police detention without a judge from 48 to 72 hours, which legal experts deemed contrary to human rights standards.

Many voices were raised against this draft, dubbed by its critics the “Barrow Constitution.” The Gambian Bar Association highlighted the difficulty in tracking the changes introduced compared to the CRC text. Civil society organizations, such as the Coalition of Progressive Gambians, denounced a recentralization of executive power and a missed opportunity to strengthen oversight institutions. The main opposition party, the UDP, promised to vote against it.

In July 2025, the draft was submitted for a second reading in Parliament. It would have needed 42 votes out of 58 to proceed; it only obtained 35, against 21 opposed. For the second time in five years, constitutional reform failed. The 1997 Constitution therefore remains in force, with all its weaknesses in terms of checks and balances. Observers fear that this impasse could compromise democratic consolidation, by maintaining a dominant executive in a polarized political climate.

To break the deadlock, figures like Chief Justice Hassan B. Jallow advocate a pragmatic approach in several stages: reach a national consensus on a small number of priority reforms – introduction of a second round in presidential elections, strict term limits, voting rights for the diaspora – before the 2026 elections, then resume the broader process afterward. Emerging political movements, such as PASTEF The Gambia, join this call, recalling the example of Dawda Jawara who, in the 1960s, accepted the verdict of an unfavorable referendum rather than bending the rules to his advantage.

Popular Perceptions and Medium-Term Challenges

Opinion polls indicate massive attachment to democratic principles. According to an Afrobarometer survey, 88% of Gambians believe that elections are the best way to choose their leaders. But trust in political parties is lower; 42% consider them sources of division. While nearly 90% say they favor term limits, many remain skeptical of the sincerity of the elites. A majority of respondents think Barrow should not seek a third term, and 60% say they would not vote for him if he ran beyond two terms.

Tip:

Daily life in Algeria reflects a notable ambivalence: on one hand, there are advances such as the expansion of public freedoms, a bolder press, and a certain regained independence of judges. On the other hand, frustration persists due to the slowness of reforms and the enduring economic difficulties. This situation manifests itself in the multiplication of land conflicts, difficulties for young people in finding employment, and the persistence of a strong temptation for clandestine emigration.

On the regional stage, Gambia remains at the heart of efforts by ECOWAS, the AU, the European Union, and the United Nations to consolidate a positive example of post-dictatorship transition. Projects like GREAT (supported by the EU and UNDP) or CODE support legal reforms, transitional justice, local governance, and civil society strengthening. In December 2024, ECOWAS approved the creation of a Special Tribunal for Gambia, intended to try crimes committed under Jammeh, in cooperation with other states in the region whose nationals were victims.

But the trajectory remains fragile. A coup attempt was still reported in late 2022, with the arrest of military personnel and civilians. Laws inherited from the Jammeh era, such as the Public Order Act severely regulating demonstrations, have not been thoroughly revised, still allowing marches to be banned on vague “security” grounds. Anti-corruption activists have been arrested for organizing a sit-in, journalists harassed for relaying rumors about a possible presidential succession being prepared behind the scenes. The fight against female genital mutilation, banned in 2015, remains at the heart of lively debates, even though in 2024 Parliament confirmed the ban law, hailed by women’s rights organizations.

The history of the country in Gambia, from this perspective, is not that of a straight line from colonization to peaceful democracy, but rather one of cycles of domination, resistance, compromise, and relapses. From the societies that built the megalithic circles to the Mali Empire, from colonial Bathurst to the Republic of 1970, from the “bloodless” coup of 1994 to the ECOWAS tanks in 2017, each stage has left scars and lessons.

Today, as the country prepares to test its institutions again in the presidential election scheduled for 2026, many voices within civil society remind that elections are not enough. Without a legitimate Constitution, effective checks and balances, independent justice, free media, and mobilized citizens, the young Gambian democracy could falter. Conversely, if these conditions are met, this small state, often overlooked on maps, could continue to play a role disproportionate to its size in the political history of West Africa.

Cyril Jarnias

Cyril Jarnias is an independent expert in international wealth management with over 20 years of experience. As an expatriate himself, he is dedicated to helping individuals and business leaders build, protect, and pass on their wealth with complete peace of mind.

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Thanks to his expertise, he offers sound advice to optimize his clients' wealth management. Cyril Jarnias is also recognized for his appearances in many prestigious media outlets such as BFM Business, les Français de l’étranger, Le Figaro, Les Echos, and Mieux vivre votre argent, where he shares his knowledge and know-how in wealth management.

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