Published on and written by Cyril Jarnias
Burma, officially Myanmar, has behind it more than two millennia of structured history, and much further back if we trace the earliest human remains. From a string of Buddhist city-states to a regional empire, then a British colony, an independent state, a military dictatorship, an unfinished democracy, and again a putschist regime, the country has experienced a succession of breaks. Understanding the history of Burma is to follow a common thread: the struggle for power between the military and civilians, the question of ethnic nationalities, and the central role of Buddhism in society and politics.
From Early Civilizations to the Kingdom of Pagan
Long before the emergence of the Burman kingdoms proper, the territory has been home to populations for hundreds of thousands of years. Archaeologists have uncovered traces of Homo erectus dating back about 750,000 years, and then Homo sapiens around 11,000 BCE, in a lithic culture called Anyathian, concentrated in the central dry zone along the Irrawaddy. From around 1500 BCE, rice was already cultivated, copper and bronze were worked, while the Iron Age began around 500 BCE, with rice-growing villages connected to trade networks from China.
The Pyu Civilization and the Mon Kingdoms
The first known organized states are the Pyu city-states, formed by Tibeto-Burman populations. Between the 2nd century BCE and the 11th century CE, they established fortified urban centers such as Beikthano, Halin, Sri Ksetra, and Binnaka. The Pyu kingdom thrived on land trade between China and India, which facilitated the early establishment of Buddhism. By the 4th century, Buddhism dominated among the Pyu elite, as attested by inscriptions in Pali, from the Theravāda tradition, engraved in a script derived from Indian Brahmi.
The Mons, who came from the kingdoms of Haribhunjaya and Dvaravati (present-day Thailand), settled in southern Burma, founding centers like Bago and Thaton, associated with the Buddhist myth of Suvarnabhumi (the ‘Land of Gold’). Meanwhile, in the northwest, Arakanese kingdoms developed around Dhanyawadi and later Mrauk U, prospering through maritime trade and links with Bengal.
All of these kingdoms were deeply Buddhized. They absorbed influence from Sri Lankan and Indian monastic networks, blending Theravāda, Mahāyāna, and Tantric traditions, but long retained local animist and nat cults.
The Birth of Pagan, the First Unified Burman Kingdom
The Burmans (Bamar), another Tibeto-Burman group, gradually moved into the upper Irrawaddy valley, likely as early as the 7th century, and more massively in the 9th. They founded the fortified city of Pagan (Bagan) on the riverbank, which became the nucleus of the first great Burman kingdom.
Under King Anawrahta in the 11th century, the Pagan kingdom, starting from the Kyaukse valley, extended its control over the Irrawaddy valley, subdued the Pyu, and captured Thaton, massively absorbing Mon culture (language, architecture, Buddhist scholarship). Influenced by the Mon monk Shin Arahan, Anawrahta adopted a reformed Theravāda. To limit the power of the Ari monks, associated with Mahāyāna and Tantrism, he partly exiled them, while integrating non-orthodox elements like nat worship. He reorganized this cult into an official pantheon of 37 spirits placed under the authority of Thagyamin.
The capital of Pagan then became an immense religious construction site. Between the 11th and 13th centuries, more than 10,000 temples and pagodas were built there, of which nearly 3,000 still survive. Burman kings presented themselves as Dharma kings, even bodhisattvas, and granted monasteries vast amounts of tax-exempt land and labor, which eventually weakened the state’s finances.
Religious Influence and Structural Weaknesses
In Pagan, Theravāda Buddhism became a major marker of political identity: kings patronized monastic schools, attracted scholars from Sri Lanka and India, and periodically reformed the saṅgha, notably through figures like the Mon monk Shin Uttarajīva, who aligned the Burmese tradition with that of the Mahāvihāra in Ceylon.
The golden age of the Pagan kingdom ended in 1287, undermined by internal tensions (religious divide between animist countryside and urban elites, economic weight of monasteries) and external shocks (new regional powers and Mongol invasions), plunging the country into a period of division.
Competing Kingdoms, Burman Dynasties, and Territorial Assertion
After the fall of Pagan, Burma fragmented into several power centers. In the north, the upper Irrawaddy valley was controlled by the Kingdom of Ava, founded in the 14th century. In the south, the Mon kingdom of Hanthawaddy (Pegu) prospered, while in the east, Shan states multiplied, and in the west, Arakan of Mrauk U grew stronger.
Ava, Hanthawaddy, Shan States, and Arakan
Ava attempted to reconstitute the former Pagan empire, but clashed with both Hanthawaddy and the Shan chieftaincies. These Shan states, of Tai origin, dominated the highlands of the north and east: Mohnyin, Mogaung, Hsenwi, and Thibaw sometimes became powerful enough to threaten Ava, which they eventually conquered in the 16th century.
In the south, Hanthawaddy brought together Mottama, Pegu, and the Irrawaddy delta, and was unified by King Razadarit. Long wars, lasting nearly forty years, between Ava and Pegu, resulted in neither achieving lasting hegemony over the entire territory.
The Kingdom of Mrauk U minted trilingual coins in Arakanese, Persian, and Bengali.
The Taungoo Empire: Unifying Burma, Then Southeast Asia
The dynamic shifted in the 16th century, when the small principality of Taungoo, in central Irrawaddy, declared its independence. Under Tabinshwehti and especially Bayinnaung, the Taungoo dynasty built an unprecedented empire. The rulers conquered Pegu, seized Ava, annexed the Shan states, subdued Lan Na, reduced Ayutthaya (Siam) to vassal status, and briefly extended their influence into the Malay Peninsula.
The Taungoo Empire, though short-lived, established a territorial framework that foreshadowed modern Burma. The kings, deeply Buddhist, strengthened monastic discipline, disseminated the Pali canon, and banned certain bloody rites, particularly in Shan funerals. But difficulties in governing such a vast territory, fiscal overburden, and regional revolts led to the collapse of the first Taungoo empire at the end of the 16th century. A phase of “restoration” followed in the 17th century, with power recentered around Ava.
The Konbaung: Expansion, Buddhist Reforms, and Clash with the British Empire
In the mid-18th century, a new dynasty took over: the Konbaung. Founded by Alaungpaya, it reconquered the south, destroyed the restored Mon kingdom of Hanthawaddy, and moved the capital according to strategic needs: Ava, Amarapura, then Mandalay. The Konbaung distinguished themselves with victorious campaigns against Siam (capture and destruction of Ayutthaya) and fierce wars against Qing China, before stabilizing diplomatic relations with the Middle Kingdom.
Under King Bodawpaya, the Konbaung dynasty undertook a deep reform of Burmese Buddhism. This policy aimed to standardize monastic discipline across the kingdom by instituting a head of the religion (sāsanabaing). It was characterized by persecution of movements deemed heretical, such as the Zoti sect which preached an omniscient creator god, and by strengthening monastic examinations. The rulers also financed the copying of the Pali canon, sent missionaries, unified village ritual practices, and asserted the supremacy of the Theravāda tradition over local nat cults.
Later, King Mindon further modernized the religious institution by convening a great Buddhist council in Mandalay. The recited canon was engraved on 729 marble slabs preserved at Kuthodaw Pagoda, presented as “the world’s largest book.” At the same time, Mindon acknowledged the growing European pressure, established a new capital at Mandalay, and attempted to reform the state.
But it was precisely during the reign of the Konbaung that the fatal confrontation with the British Empire began.
The British Colonial Conquest and the Establishment of “Burma”
In the 19th century, as the Konbaung still attempted to extend their domination toward Assam, Manipur, and Arakan, British interests in India collided with Burmese ambitions. Three Anglo-Burmese Wars sealed the country’s fate.
Three Wars and the End of the Monarchy
The first war was triggered by the expansion of the Konbaung dynasty into Arakan and Assam, bordering British territory. British troops captured Rangoon without resistance, then conducted a costly campaign in both men and finances. The conflict ended with a treaty imposing the cession of Arakan and Tenasserim to Britain, along with a heavy indemnity. For the British Empire, it was then the most expensive and deadliest war in the history of British India.
A second war, in 1852, allowed London to annex Lower Burma, notably to secure control of a strategic port and rich teak forests. The British consolidated these territories by integrating them in 1862 into a directly governed province, soon named “British Burma.”
The third war, in 1885, was swift. Using the pretext of King Thibaw’s tyranny and his alleged intrigues with France, colonial troops marched on Mandalay, entering in less than two weeks. The sovereign was exiled to India, the monarchy abolished, and Burma was proclaimed a province of British India, administered by a lieutenant-governor. Armed resistance continued for several years in the north, where the British resorted to brutal tactics: burned villages, forced relocation of populations into “strategic hamlets,” and mobilization of tens of thousands of Indian and British soldiers.
Historical context of British colonization of Burma
From January 1, 1886, “Burma” officially became a province of British India. In 1937, it was separated from India and transformed into a Crown Colony with its own administration.
“Divide and Rule”: Ethnic Fractures and Social Upheavals
Colonial administration imposed a dual system: direct government in the predominantly Burman central plains, and an indirect rule in the “frontier areas,” inhabited by hill ethnic groups (Karen, Kachin, Shan, Chin, etc.). This division deepened the gap between “Burma proper” and “frontier territories,” reactivating and instrumentalizing ethnic and religious differences.
The colonizers secularized the state, broke the organic link between monarchy and saṅgha, abolished the office of patriarch of the monastic community, and weakened the institutional role of Buddhism. They gradually abolished slavery, established modern hospitals in Rangoon, and built railways and ports. But they largely excluded Burmans from supervisory positions in the army, preferring to recruit minorities (Karen, Anglo-Burmese, Indians), which later fueled Bamar resentment.
Economically, the Irrawaddy became a vast rice bowl for export to India and beyond, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal. Thousands of Indian migrants came to work in the rice paddies and colonial cities. Better integrated into credit circuits and accepting lower wages, they often supplanted indebted Burman peasants, accelerating rural impoverishment. The export-oriented economy made Burma the world’s leading rice exporter and a giant in teak, oil, and rubies, but wealth was concentrated in the hands of British companies and large landowners, often Indian. In Burman villages, this led to rising unemployment, crime, and a sense of dispossession.
Rise of Nationalism and World War
Faced with this domination, a Burman nationalism gradually took shape. Associations like the General Council of Burmese Associations were formed as early as the 1920s. Politically engaged monks led resistance movements, blending defense of Buddhism and patriotism. Peasant revolts broke out, such as the Saya San rebellion in the early 1930s, which started as a tax protest and turned into a near-general insurrection. It was crushed at the cost of thousands of deaths, but served as a springboard for future nationalist leaders.
In the 1930s, Burman nationalism was structured by urban and student youth, marked by a strike in 1936 led by U Nu and Aung San. This movement joined the Thakins, a radical group inspired by Marxism and Indian and Chinese anti-imperialist struggles, demanding independence. This nationalism was fueled by several events: the Hsaya San peasant revolt, the influence of the Indian National Congress, Japan’s victory over Russia at the turn of the century, and the spread of socialist ideas.
When World War II broke out, Aung San and his comrades sought external support to wrest independence. They first turned to the Japanese.
From World War to Independence: The Rise and Assassination of Aung San
At the turn of the 1940s, Aung San left Burma to seek international aid. Recruited by Japanese officers, he formed with twenty-nine comrades the nucleus of the future Burmese army, the “Thirty Comrades,” trained on Hainan Island. With Japanese help, they created the Burma Independence Army (BIA) and accompanied the Japanese invasion, then the fall of Rangoon.
Collaboration Then Break with Japan
Initially allied with Tokyo, Aung San became Minister of War in the Burmese government installed by the Japanese in Rangoon. But the brutality of the occupation, atrocities against civilians, and repression of communities considered pro-British—including some Muslim groups, such as the Rohingya in Arakan—gradually turned nationalists away from Japan. Aung San clandestinely founded the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), which united his army, the Burmese communists, and socialists.
In 1945, the Burmese army, which had initially collaborated with the Japanese occupation forces, switched sides and turned its weapons against Japan to join the Allies. This strategic reversal played an important role in the reconquest of Burma, carried out mainly by British troops and their Indian soldiers.
Negotiating Independence and the Hope for a Federal Union
After the war, London had to deal with an Aung San who had become indispensable. Initially threatened with prosecution for collaboration, he was eventually integrated into the Governor’s Executive Council, becoming de facto head of the local government. He then conducted a dual negotiation: with the British for independence, and with ethnic leaders to maintain the unity of the future state.
On the colonial side, an agreement with British Prime Minister Attlee committed the United Kingdom to granting independence within a very short timeframe, with the possibility for Burma to leave the Commonwealth. Meanwhile, Aung San gathered Shan, Kachin, and Chin representatives in the small town of Panglong. The resulting agreement promised broad autonomy to the hill regions and, for some, the right to secede after ten years. This commitment would be at the heart of future tensions.
After World War II, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) established itself as the main political force in Burma, paving the way for a constitutional transition.
The AFPFL won a large majority of seats in the elections for the Constituent Assembly, consolidating its popular legitimacy.
This victory created the conditions for a controlled political transition toward a system of parliamentary government.
The Founding Trauma: The Assassination of Aung San
In July 1947, everything changed. Aung San and several members of his provisional government were assassinated in Rangoon by a commando linked to U Saw, a conservative political rival. The sudden disappearance of the main architect of independence and a figure trusted by minorities plunged the country into mourning and left a considerable political vacuum.
U Nu, Aung San’s comrade-in-arms, was tasked with forming a new cabinet and finalizing a constitution. That constitution established a parliamentary republic with a bicameral Parliament, a ceremonial president, and a prime minister responsible to the Assembly. Burma finally gained independence in early 1948, outside the Commonwealth, under the name Union of Burma. But behind the scenes, the seeds of future conflicts were already planted: ethnic dissatisfaction, distrust between communists and moderates, and the question of Buddhism’s place in the state.
The Early Years of Independence: Fragile Democracy and Internal Wars
The early years of independence were marked by a dual movement: the attempt to build a socialist parliamentary democracy and the proliferation of armed rebellions. The civilian government, led by U Nu, had to govern amidst a veritable mosaic of insurrections.
Communist Insurrections and Ethnic Revolts
From the late 1940s, the Communist Party of Burma took up arms against the government, accusing the AFPFL leaders of compromise with the British. The Karens, who had been particularly prominent in the colonial army, felt threatened in the new Bamar-dominated Union. They formed the core of the Karen National Union (KNU), fighting Rangoon for independence and later for genuine federalism. Their armed forces, the Karen National Liberation Army, waged a long-term guerrilla war along the Thai border.
In other regions, the Shan, Kachin, Mon, Chin, Karenni, and Rakhine also took up arms to contest centralism and the failure to implement the Panglong promises. In Arakan, Muslim groups—the Rohingya mujahideen—demanded in the 1950s annexation to East Pakistan (Bangladesh), before their movement fizzled out under various military operations.
Under pressure from these conflicts, corruption, and instability within the AFPFL itself, the civilian government gradually lost control of a large part of the territory. In this context, the army, the Tatmadaw, gained political weight and presented itself as the only bulwark against the country’s disintegration.
First Direct Military Intervention: The “Caretaker Government” of 1958
In the late 1950s, internal divisions within the AFPFL threatened to lead to a spontaneous coup d’état. U Nu, aware of the risk, himself invited the army chief, General Ne Win, to lead a caretaker government. From 1958 to 1960, the army thus officially ran the country, reduced corruption, restored order in the bureaucracy, and dealt firmly with “private armies.”
The interim military government organized competitive elections in 1960, allowing a return to civilian power. However, this transition reinforced the image of the army as a guarantor of stability in public opinion. Two years later, the army retook power, this time without the prime minister’s consent.
1962: Ne Win, the Coup, and the “Burmese Way to Socialism”
In March 1962, the army overthrew U Nu’s government. The coup was almost bloodless, at least officially, but it marked a major turning point: the end of parliamentary democracy and the beginning of a long era of military dictatorship.
The Revolutionary Council and Socialist Ideology
Ne Win and the putschist officers suspended the 1947 constitution and established a Revolutionary Council that governed by decree. They quickly created a single party, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the junta’s exclusive political instrument, and proclaimed a “Burmese Way to Socialism.” The stated goal was to protect the country from foreign influences, centralize the economy, and reduce inequalities.
From 1963, the Burmese state nationalized key sectors (oil, trade, banks, large enterprises), forcing the departure of entrepreneurial Indian and Chinese minorities. All political opposition was banned from 1964, with the dissolution of parties and press control. Universities, centers of dissent, were severely repressed, culminating in the shooting of students and the destruction of their union in Rangoon in 1962.
War on Rebellions and International Isolation
Meanwhile, the army sought to crush insurgent movements. The Kachin and Shan intensified their rebellions. New groups emerged, some inspired by Maoism and supported by China, such as the Communist Party of Burma, which waged its own “cultural revolution” along the Sino-Burmese border. The regime rejected any idea of federalism, seen as a threat to national unity.
Socialist ideology and state control of the economy, coupled with diplomatic isolation, transformed Burma, despite its resource wealth, into one of the poorest and most closed countries in Asia. This situation led to the flourishing of a black market and the deterioration of public services. Pacification attempts, such as the 1980 amnesty for some rebels, proved insufficient to establish lasting peace.
The Explosion of 1988: The “8888 Uprising”
By the late 1980s, the economy was on the verge of collapse and popular anger had reached a critical level. In March 1988, students demonstrated in Rangoon against shortages, corruption, and catastrophic currency management. The movement spread throughout society. On August 8, 1988, a general strike day brought together hundreds of thousands of people across the country. Soldiers opened fire, killing at least several thousand.
Ne Win officially resigned from the presidency and the leadership of the BSPP, but the army retained the initiative. In September, a new military crackdown ended any hope of reform. The junta reorganized under a different name.
The SLORC then SPDC Dictatorship: Confiscated Elections and Persistence of Civil War
After the 1988 bloodbath, the army created the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). This new body replaced the previous structure but maintained military control over all levers of power.
Appearance of Transition: 1990 Elections and Rejection of the Ballot Box Verdict
To ease international and domestic pressure, the SLORC promised legislative elections. They were held in 1990 and, according to observers, were relatively free. To the junta’s surprise, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi—daughter of Aung San, who had become an iconic figure of the pro-democracy movement—won an overwhelming victory, with a large majority of seats.
After the NLD’s electoral victory in 1990, the military junta (SLORC) refused to transfer power. It declared that the elected assembly would only be a constituent body, prevented it from convening, and kept Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. The ballot box verdict was ignored. The regime hardened with arrests and human rights violations. In 1997, the junta changed its name to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), without any real change in power.
Ethnic Conflicts, Repression, and International Sanctions
In the peripheral areas, war continued. Some ethnic organizations, however, signed bilateral ceasefires in the 1990s, sometimes in exchange for economic concessions or de facto autonomy. The Tatmadaw simultaneously conducted particularly brutal counter-insurgency campaigns, especially in eastern Myanmar, where thousands of Karen, Shan, and Karenni villages were destroyed and hundreds of thousands of people were displaced or became refugees in Thailand.
NGOs and international legal experts eventually described these policies as ethnic cleansing, or even genocide in some cases. The West adopted sanctions, particularly the United States in 1997, targeting SPDC leaders and key economic sectors. But the junta found support in China, Russia, and some Southeast Asian countries, limiting the effect of this isolation.
The “Roadmap” to a “Discipline-Flourishing Democracy”
Faced with a growing legitimacy crisis, the monk revolt during the “Saffron Revolution” in 2007, and the humanitarian catastrophe of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the junta eventually embarked on a controlled transition process. It had a new constitution drafted, submitted to a referendum amidst the humanitarian crisis. The vote, marred by intimidation and fraud, resulted in the adoption of a text that locked in the army’s central role.
Percentage of parliamentary seats reserved for the military under the new constitutional framework.
The first elections under this framework were held in 2010. The main military-linked party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), won overwhelmingly, as the NLD boycotted the vote. A civilian figurehead president, Thein Sein, a former general, was installed in Nay Pyi Taw, a new capital built from scratch in the center of the country.
2011–2015: Controlled Opening and “Burmese Spring”
Under the presidency of Thein Sein, Burma experienced a period of political opening unprecedented in decades. The government released thousands of political prisoners, relaxed censorship on the press and internet, legalized trade unions, and embarked on economic reforms to attract foreign investment.
Political Liberalization and Return of Aung San Suu Kyi
Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest, the laws preventing the NLD from contesting were amended, and in 2012, the party participated in by-elections, winning almost all contested seats. The presence of opposition MPs in parliament, even as a minority, marked a symbolic break. The international community hailed these advances; several sanctions were eased, and Hillary Clinton, then Barack Obama, visited the country, signaling a dramatic warming of relations with the United States.
Government reforms, including a new framework for international investment, exchange rate reform, and tax laws, led to strong economic growth, appreciation of the local currency, and a spectacular increase in foreign investment. These measures allowed foreign investors to lease land and set up businesses without a local partner, provided they progressively employed skilled Burmese labor.
Limits and Ambiguities of the Transition
Nevertheless, criticisms were plentiful. The judicial system remained largely under the control of the authorities, the army retained its impunity in conflict zones, laws restricting the freedom to demonstrate were passed, and wars continued in several ethnic states, particularly in the north (Kachin, Shan). The military’s weight in parliament and government remained structural, making any constitutional revision extremely difficult.
Some analysts see these reforms more as a survival strategy for the military regime than genuine democratization. The desire to once again become the civilian face of the state apparatus, while protecting the generals’ economic interests, is often cited to explain the partial opening orchestrated by Than Shwe and his successors.
Analysts
2015–2020: NLD Victory, Cohabitation with the Military, and the Rohingya Crisis
The next general elections, in 2015, were considered largely free and fair. Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD won an overwhelming victory, far surpassing the USDP. Hope for a definitive transition to a civilian regime then dominated commentary.
A Civilian Government Under Military Tutelage
Due to a constitutional clause barring anyone with a foreign spouse or children from the presidency, Aung San Suu Kyi could not become official head of state. A close associate, Htin Kyaw, was elected president, while a custom-made position, “State Counsellor,” was created for her. This role, analogous to a prime minister, made her the de facto head of government.
The military retained key ministries, 25% of parliamentary seats, and an effective veto over constitutional reforms, requiring more than 75% of votes. Attempts to reduce its influence were systematically blocked by military MPs, maintaining an institutionalized “cohabitation” where the army remained a state within a state.
The Nightmare of Arakan: Persecution of the Rohingya
At the same time, a humanitarian and political drama unfolded in Rakhine State (Arakan). There, a Muslim minority, the Rohingya, long present on the coast but largely arriving during the colonial era, were progressively stripped of fundamental rights by the central authorities. The 1982 Citizenship Law excluded them from the 135 recognized ethnic groups, rendering them stateless, without documents, and subject to severe restrictions: limits on marriage, number of children in some areas, movement, and limited access to education and employment.
Communal tensions between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims led to massive violence in 2012, then in 2016 and especially 2017, when a Rohingya armed group, the ARSA, attacked security posts. The military’s response was extremely brutal: so-called “clearance” operations, razed villages, rapes, executions. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled to neighboring Bangladesh, where the world’s largest refugee camp was established. The UN spoke of ethnic cleansing and possible genocide. A case was brought before the International Court of Justice by Gambia.
The civilian government, constrained by the influence of the military but also anxious not to lose the support of the Buddhist majority, offered only minimal support to the Rohingya and denied accusations of genocide. Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, even went to The Hague to defend the Burmese state, causing profound disillusionment among her former international supporters.
An Unstable Cohabitation
Meanwhile, conflict with other ethnic armed groups continued, despite a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signed in 2015 with only part of the organizations. Talks were held to build a future federal state, but the process remained slow and shaky. The NLD had to juggle military pressure, minority distrust, and socio-economic challenges, including poverty reduction and infrastructure modernization.
In 2020, despite these limits and controversies, the NLD once again won the elections overwhelmingly, with an even higher score than in 2015. The USDP, the pro-military party, suffered a severe defeat. The ballot box verdict seemed clear. But for the army command, this result was perceived as a direct threat.
2021: The Military Coup and the Slide into Civil War
On the morning of February 1, as the new parliament was to convene for the first time since the elections, the army launched a coup. Special forces arrested Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and many NLD officials. Communications were cut, internet access disrupted, state television interrupted. The military vice-president, Myint Swe, appeared to declare a state of emergency citing the 2008 constitution, then transferred all powers to the commander-in-chief, Min Aung Hlaing.
Contested Legal Justifications, Massive Popular Rejection
The military accused the NLD of massive electoral fraud and blamed the election commission for refusing to investigate. No credible evidence supported these allegations, and most independent observers considered the vote largely regular. Many legal experts deemed the use of constitutional articles justifying the state of emergency abusive: the legitimate president, Win Myint, had not consented, and several civilian members of the National Defence and Security Council, which was supposed to be consulted, had been arrested.
Despite the takeover, the coup was massively rejected by the population. Large-scale protests erupted across the country, from major cities to rural areas. A civil disobedience movement organized, with many civil servants, teachers, doctors, and bankers refusing to cooperate with the regime. The mobilization relied heavily on social media, prompting the junta to temporarily block Facebook and take measures against independent media.
From Peaceful Protest to Widespread Armed Struggle
In the first weeks, most protests were peaceful. But the military’s response was of increasing violence: live fire on marches, mass arrests, torture, extrajudicial executions. Quickly, the death toll reached thousands, while tens of thousands were imprisoned.
After the 2021 military coup in Burma, ousted parliamentarians formed a National Unity Government in exile (NUG) to claim democratic legitimacy. In response to violent repression, the NUG proclaimed a “defensive war” and created an armed wing, the People’s Defence Forces (PDF). These new militias cooperated with already established ethnic rebel groups, such as the Kachin Independence Army, the Karen National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army, and coalitions like the Three Brotherhood Alliance.
Gradually, the conflict spread to almost the entire country. Clashes, initially concentrated in ethnic peripheries, now affected the central Burman regions, even to the outskirts of Mandalay and Yangon. Cities saw the emergence of clandestine resistance units, while entire areas slipped from junta control, which now only firmly held a few major urban centers and logistical axes, relying heavily on air power and artillery.
Summary Tables: Major Political Periods and the Role of the Military
To better grasp the political trajectory of the country, one can summarize the main phases and the role of the Tatmadaw in an overview.
| Period | Dominant Political Regime | Role of the Military |
|---|---|---|
| Pre-colonial Monarchies (Pagan, Taungoo, Konbaung) | Centralized Buddhist Monarchies | Pillar of royalty, conquests, and maintaining internal order |
| British Colonization | Province then Crown Colony | Dissolved, replaced by colonial army (Indians, minorities) |
| 1948–1962 | Unstable Parliamentary Democracy | Heir to independence struggle, increasing arbiter of internal crises |
| 1962–1988 | Military Socialist Dictatorship (BSPP) | Direct power via Revolutionary Council, then single party |
| 1988–2011 | Military Junta (SLORC/SPDC) | Total state control, repression of opponents, ethnic wars |
| 2011–2021 | Civilian Government under Pro-Military Constitution | Dominant influence via parliamentary quotas, key ministries, and emergency powers |
| Since 2021 | Military Junta (State Administration Council) and Civil War | De facto power, contested on the ground by NUG, PDF, and ethnic armed groups |
This continuity of military power is one of the threads running through modern Burmese political history.
A Major Humanitarian Crisis and Territorial Reshuffling
Repression and war triggered a humanitarian catastrophe of historic proportions. The economy contracted sharply, wiping out gains made during the previous decade. Health services collapsed, hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, the strike of many healthcare workers, and insecurity. The World Food Programme warned of the risk of famine for millions of people, while hundreds of thousands of civilians fled to India, Thailand, or were internally displaced.
The military uses scorched-earth tactics, including systematic destruction of villages, bombing of schools, hospitals, and monasteries, as well as mass executions. Human rights organizations describe these acts as war crimes and crimes against humanity, noting they recall methods previously used against minorities.
In several states, combined PDF and ethnic organization forces recaptured bases, border posts, and secondary towns. By late 2023, some analyses estimated that pro-democracy forces and their allies effectively controlled more than half of the territory, without however managing to overthrow the junta, which remained solidly entrenched in certain major cities and still benefited from discreet support from foreign powers providing weapons, ammunition, and aviation fuel.
Ethnic Conflicts: An Endless War?
As a backdrop to the civilian-military struggle, Burma remains torn by what is often presented as one of the longest civil wars in the world. Since 1948, most years have seen fighting in at least one ethnic region.
Colonial Legacy and Betrayed Promises
The origin of these conflicts is multiple. The British policy of “divide and rule” entrenched a divide between central Burman regions and frontier areas governed separately. The Panglong Agreement, seen by many ethnic leaders as a founding contract for a truly federal Union, was never fully respected after Aung San’s death. The guarantees of autonomy, even the right to secede after ten years, were reneged under U Nu, then buried by Ne Win.
The table below allows locating some of the main ethnic armed organizations and their demands.
| Main Armed Group | Region of Operation | Initial Dominant Demand |
|---|---|---|
| Karen National Union (KNU) / KNLA | Kayin State, Thai border | Independence, then federalism guaranteeing autonomy |
| Kachin Independence Organisation / KIA | Kachin State, north | Regional autonomy, control of resources, federalism |
| Shan State Army (SSA) | Shan State, northeast | Autonomy, sometimes right to secession, federalism |
| Arakan Army (AA) | Rakhine State (Arakan) | Political autonomy and local control of resources |
| Rohingya organizations (historical) | Northern Arakan | Autonomy or annexation to East Pakistan, then civil rights and security |
On this already complex foundation, the centralizing and often chauvinistic policy of successive governments, whether civilian or military, has fostered a climate of chronic distrust. Particularly violent military operations in the east and north, based on a strategy known as the “four cuts” (depriving rebels of food, funding, intelligence, and recruits), have caused the deaths of thousands of civilians and the displacement of millions over the decades.
Role of Buddhism and Religious Fractures
In this troubled history, Buddhism holds an ambivalent place. On one hand, it constitutes the primary cultural cement of the Burman majority: nearly 90% of the population adheres to Theravāda, and the Constitution recognizes this religion a “special position.” Monasteries play a central social role in education, mediation, and solidarity. Monks have often been resistance figures, such as those who led the Saffron Revolution in 2007 or, earlier, some anti-colonial mobilizations.
The politicization of Buddhism has engendered exclusivist nationalist movements, hostile to Muslims. Under the influence of radical preachers like the monk Wirathu, an Islamophobic discourse spread, portraying Muslims, especially the Rohingya, as a demographic and identity threat. These rhetorics fueled anti-Muslim pogroms in the 2010s and facilitated acceptance by part of public opinion of the massive repression in Rakhine State.
The Rohingya Question, Mirror of the Union’s Contradictions
The situation of the Rohingya illustrates both the lasting effects of colonization, post-independence exclusion policies, and Bamar and Rakhine religious nationalism. Under the Arakan Kingdom and then British rule, Muslim populations became permanently established on the coast. After independence, they were initially recognized as full citizens under the citizenship law, participated in elections, and sent MPs to Parliament.
Official Burmese discourse redefined the Rohingya as “Bengalis,” recent migrants, denying their indigeneity. Military operations in 1978 and 1991–1992 caused mass exoduses. The 1982 law excluded them from recognized groups, classifying them as “foreigners,” leading to systematic restrictions and violence. This population is now stateless, rejected by both Burma and Bangladesh.
The 2017 crisis merely pushed an old dynamic to its extreme. More than half a million Rohingya are crammed into camps in Cox’s Bazar, while those remaining in Burma continue to suffer a de facto apartheid regime, worsened in recent years by the war between the army and the Arakan Army.
An Unfinished History: Between Collapse and Recomposition
The history of Burma resembles a succession of cycles: monarchical centralization, fragmentation and wars, imperial recolonization, an attempt at pluralistic nation-building, military recentralization, partial opening, and authoritarian relapse. At each stage, three major tensions recur.
The first pits the army against civilian power. Heir to the independence struggle, the Tatmadaw forged an image as a tutelary institution, convinced that only its control can preserve the country’s unity. This conviction, amplified by colossal economic interests—military conglomerates, monopolies over resources—explains its deep reluctance to cede a significant share of its power.
The second tension concerns the ethnic question. The Union of Burma has never truly resolved the contradiction between a highly centralized state dominated by the Bamar and peripheral ethnicities aspiring to autonomy, cultural recognition, and resource sharing. The unfulfilled promise of federalism, contained in the spirit of Panglong, continues to haunt the country.
The third touches on the articulation between Buddhism, national identity, and religious pluralism. While Buddhism has served as a refuge, a force for mobilization, and a vector of emancipation at certain moments in history, it has also been co-opted by chauvinistic currents that have fueled discrimination and justified policies of exclusion, even persecution, toward minorities, especially Muslims.
The country is in a civil war between the military junta (State Administration Council) and a coalition of pro-democracy forces, ethnic armed groups, and popular militias. In areas beyond junta control, new local political structures are emerging (administrations, schools, customary courts, de facto federalism). The future remains uncertain, between risks of fragmentation, prolonged authoritarian hardening, or a possibility of deep political recomposition.
The history of Burma is therefore not a linear narrative leading from point A to point B, but a succession of ruptures in which the same essential questions recur in different forms: who governs, in whose name, and in whose interest? As long as these questions have not found inclusive answers, for both the Bamar majority and the many minorities that make up the Union, Burma will remain torn between its democratic aspirations, its internal fractures, and the weight of a military apparatus that, until now, has almost always ended up regaining the upper hand.
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